
Since
a
nation
has
both a geographic
and a
political
dimension,
it has “geopolitical”
interests.
These
geopolitical
interests
are the
interests that
a
nation
has in maintaining
or
acquiring
positions
that
would,
caeteris paribus,
increase
its
power
relative
to
other
nations.
These
interests are
defined
and limited by the
physical
and human geography
of
the nation,
and
are therefore mostly
static.
When
they
change,
they
change
only
very slowly,
when
certain
geographic
conditions
vary
(e.g.
climatic,
demographic
or
economic
changes).
Each
nation, therefore, has its own specific and
unique
geopolitical interests, which can be determined independently from
other considerations.
Geopolitical
interests are such a fundamental part of a nation's political culture
that they are often instinctively taken for granted, even by civilian
and military leaders.[1] Even the language of geopolitics becomes
biased as a result; certain words receive their meanings according to
which nationals use them. Words that have such varying geopolitical
meanings are: “nation”, “security”, “defence”,
“international community”, etc. Part of the mistrust
and misunderstanding that currently exist between nations is probably
due to the common assumption that such political
terms are
neutral when in reality
they are
subjective.
This is
yet another obstacle that prevents nations from realising
their geopolitical interests in a consensual way.
This
question of the realisation of geopolitical interests requires
a different approach compared to the analysis of geopolitical
interests as such. Whatever geopolitical interests a nation has,
whether or not these geopolitical interests can or will be realised
is an entirely different matter, which depends on the political,
economic and administrative situation of the nation in question, with
all the day-to-day uncertainties that this implies.[2] It is also
important to remember that geopolitical interests are only one of
many aspects that drive a nation's foreign policy. Other aspects
include, for instance, ideology, purely economic interests, domestic
politics, and even sometimes the influence of erroneous estimations
and the sway of emotions. Geopolitical interests are generally a
substantial and underlying part of nation's foreign policy –
indeed, they inform it. But they can sometimes be overshadowed by
more short-term and pressing interests that take over foreign policy,
temporarily at least.
Another
reason for the necessary distinction between geopolitical interests
and their realisation is that there is a natural order of priority to
the realisation of geopolitical interests; like a Maslow's hierarchy
of human needs but for nations.[3] A nation's most fundamental
geopolitical interests are those of a lower order; they are the most
basic interests related to the integrity of its territory, the
protection of its people, and the defence of borders. These interests
must be fulfilled before the realisation of interests of a higher
order can be contemplated.[4] There cannot be sufficient political
attention or resources available for the realisation of more advanced
geopolitical interests, if primary ones have not first been
addressed. The Roman Empire did not set out to conquer the
Mediterranean before the Republic controlled the Italian peninsula.
Great Britain did not manage to control the world's sea lanes before
it had secured the waters near its coast. Sweden did not succeed in
dominating, briefly, the Baltic sea before the yoke of the Danish
crown had been cast off. The realisation of geopolitical interests is
a long process for a nation, involving gains and setbacks. Nations
can spend centuries painstakingly trying to fulfil their geopolitical
dreams, though few ever realise them all.
Indeed,
there are often barriers to
realising geopolitical interests. Nations
eventually become
constrained by resource
limitations
that come from military or economic over-expansion,
if they have not been
stopped by others nations.[5]
The
United States
is quite exceptional in this
sense, since it is one of
only a
handful of nations in History
that has
come close to realising the
majority of its geopolitical
interests for
a short period of time.[6]
It was
certainly helpful that
the early US leaders gradually
took control
of a land
with a very
favourable geography,
whose political
borders now largely
correspond to natural
borders. Yet, even the
most powerful nations
can
generally not
realise all their
geopolitical interests, at
least not indefinitely, as
is evident from some recent US setbacks.[7]
It is unlikely that the
United States will be able to
realise its highest geopolitical interest of global
hegemony, as
US power in the world has
arguably been
in slow decline in the last
decades.
Geopolitics
is,
therefore, not
primarily the study of
geopolitical interests, but
the study of their realisation.
Geopolitics is mainly about
tactics, not as
much about strategy.
Nations
are usually
well
aware of their
geopolitical interests,
but generally not so
certain how (to
try)
to realise them, since
there are myriad
ways to do so, and
many uncertainties
in doing so, in a constantly shifting political landscape.
To solve such problems is
the main goal of geopolitics. It is the
study of
the obstacles
to realising geopolitical
interests, and
in assessing how
these obstacles could
be overcome, using the means
at disposal.
All
nations' geopolitical interests cannot be realised
simultaneously;
therefore,
some of them will
be realised
at the expense of others. Geopolitics
is thus based
on the premise that nations
are engaged in
a subtle, or sometimes not
so subtle, competition with
each other,
at many different levels:
diplomatically,
economically, militarily and
even culturally. The
history of modern nations
is largely a
history of never-ending
conflicts
of interests.
As a nation succeeds
in realising
geopolitical interests
of an ever-higher
order, further and further
away from its primary,
lower-order interests,
at some point there will be
a clash with the
interests of other nations.
A nation's
expansion of
what it calls its
“defence perimeter” is
often perceived by another
nation as the adoption
of a
“threatening” or
“aggressive position.”[8]
Again, it is a question of semantics and
of
geopolitical world-view.
When
two nations' geopolitical interests conflict, the
stronger nation
can realise its interests by
persuading or forcing
the weaker nation to yield. This can be done in
a number of different ways;
by promising economic
advantages,
by economic pressure
such as the
threat or
actual use
of sanctions, by
acts of subversion,
by threat
of force, and ultimately
by military
force.
It is of course tempting for
the most powerful
nations of the world to use
such methods; indeed,
they often do so. For
instance, most of
US foreign policy is based on such tactics.
The
coercive realisation of geopolitical interests is, still
today, the standard way in
which the international system
works.
It
is possible, however,
for geopolitical
interests to
be realised without
the
use of such
coercive
means.
Nations
can realise
geopolitical
interests consensually, to
the satisfaction of all
involved parties,
if the
following two conditions are
fulfilled.
First, the
geopolitical
interests
of all
parties
should
generally
complement
each other. Of
course, some
negotiations
concerning
details would
still take
place,
but
between equal
parties.
Second, no
third party should prevent the
realisation of the interests
in question.
Most
likely, such
external involvement can
come
from another
nation or from an
international organisation. Though
these two
conditions seem reasonable enough, in reality, they
are not so often fulfilled.
A
final point can be mentioned with regard to the realisation of
geopolitical interests. In the last decades, geopolitics has become
somewhat less important, because nations have seen their power and
sovereignty slowly erode, as globalist, internationalist developments
have taken place. Globalisation has made the role that national
governments play in international business far less important than it
was.[9] Thanks to IT technology and cheap transport, even small and
medium sized companies – usually the backbone of healthy economies
– have become far less dependent on domestic markets and on the
political and material support from their government when investing
and selling abroad. Further, the emergence of international
organisations with supranational jurisdiction (e.g. UN, Bank of
International Settlements, EU, IMF, World Bank, WTO, etc.)[10], and
their increasing influence over the affairs of the world, has also
drained sovereignty from national governments.[11]
The
result of this evolution in global politics is that geopolitical
interests are becoming more difficult, but also less important, for
nations to realise.[12] Economic and political interests are becoming
less tied to geography than before, because they are less tied to
nations.[13] The realisation of geopolitical interests give nations
less rewards than in the past; they will thus dedicate less resources
towards efforts to realise them. However, the underlying reason why
geopolitical interests are becoming less important in this new
international context is because geopolitics is based on an incorrect
assumption; namely, that the interests of the government and the
interests of the people are the same. The next part, therefore, looks
at the distinction between State and people, which must be taken into
account in order for geopolitical analysis to be complete.
Notes:
[1]
For instance, George Friedman wrote, correctly,
that: “A country’s grand strategy is so deeply embedded in that
nation’s DNA, and appears so natural and obvious, that politicians
and generals are not always aware of it. Their logic is so
constrained by it that it is an almost unconscious reality. But
from a geopolitical perspective, both the grand strategy of a country
and the logic driving a country’s leaders become obvious.” George
Friedman, in his book “The Next 100 Years”, from p39 (Doubleday).
Source: www.fd.unl.pt/docentes_docs/ma/amg_MA_11180.pdf
[2]
There may
be many reasons why the
government and
bureaucracy may
not be able, at a
given moment, to
adequately
pursue
the realisation
of a nation's
geopolitical interests.
Certain people
or organisations may for
instance not be
competent enough, or
may have serious
distractions (e.g.
bad economic
figures, upcoming re-elections,
etc.), or
not enough resources, experience
or guidelines.
[3]
See for
instance, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maslow%27s_hierarchy_of_needs
[4]
See for
instance, the description of the
five major geostrategic
goals of the United
States, by
George Friedman, in his book
“The Next 100
Years”, Doubleday. From
p58. Source:
www.fd.unl.pt/docentes_docs/ma/amg_MA_11180.pdf
[5]
For
instance, George Friedman wrote: “All
nations have grand strategies, though this does not mean all nations
can achieve their strategic goals. Lithuania’s goal is to be free
of foreign occupation. But its economy, demography, and geography
make it unlikely that Lithuania will ever achieve its goal more than
occasionally and temporarily. The United States, unlike most other
countries in the world, has achieved most of its strategic goals,
which I will outline in a moment. Its economy and society are both
geared toward this effort.” George
Friedman, in his book
“The Next 100
Years”, from p39
(Doubleday).
Source:
www.fd.unl.pt/docentes_docs/ma/amg_MA_11180.pdf
[6]
Generally
it never lasts more than a couple of centuries at
most: It is
possible to mention the Persian empire and the Roman Empire for
little more than a century, China during the 15th
and 16th
centuries, Britain during most of the 19th
century, and the USA from 1945.
[7]
For
instance, the continuous rise of China, and the political
and commercial gains
of China in Africa. The progressive shift in the power balance with
China due to the
huge US current
account deficit with
China and
China's
substantial ownership of US Treasury bonds.
Also can be
mentioned the
relative failure in Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan, and on-going
hesitations of the US concerning Syria.
The inability of
the US to bring Russia to heel. Etc, etc.
[8]
There are
countless examples of this, from the US/Japan conflict of the 30s and
40s, to the current clash between China and Japan over a group of
islands, as China is slowly expanding its naval presence.
[9]
Their control of capital has decreased, and tariffs and
subsidies have been reduced in many parts of the world (these confer
power to those who apply them – the national governments). Further,
embassies and chambers of commerce do not have the same importance as
before. Despite the constant attempts by national governments to
limit, tax, or at least monitor, the movement of people, goods and
capital, they are undoubtedly being undermined by such developments.
Though
there has been a resurgence of national
authority after
the 2007-2009
financial
crisis, (completely
unwarranted, of course, since national governments
were largely responsible for the crisis in the first place), this is
likely only
temporary.
[10]
See, for
instance,
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supranational_aspects_of_international_organizations
[11]
Regarding
international organisations, it is
true that most
of them are
financed by the most
powerful
nations
of the world, in
order to help them realise their geopolitical interests under a veil
of legitimacy.
Yet,
at the same
time, the
power of these organisations,
not so much militarily but economically and legally,
has
grown over time,
at the expense
of these
nations.
This factor also contributes to the decline in the
importance of geopolitics.
[12]
This
development could initially benefit
mostly the smaller and the weaker nations of the world; those nations
whose many interests have never been realised
because of the existence of a handful overbearing powers. The
most powerful
nations are
naturally most
impacted by these globalist
changes (since
their range of
interests is wider and more global).
The US's
interests in the Middle East and Asia, and France's interests in
Africa come to mind.
[13]
Natural
comparative advantages between nations matter far less than they did
in the 19th
century. See
for instance, “Global Trade and Conflicting National Interests”,
by Professors R. E. Gomory and W. J. Baumol. MIT Press, 2000.