Government
can never be fully representative, even in an ideal democracy. Yet,
though no government can possibly represent all interests of all
people, in a democracy the government's interests are the people's
interests (or at least of the majority that elected it). One of the
reasons modern nations should not be called “democratic” is
that their governments have many interests which are not the
interests of the people.[1] Geopolitical interests are a good example
of such government interests that are not shared by the people.
There is an obvious reason for this misalignment of geopolitical interests between the State and the people. Nations, as opposed to individuals, are defined by territorial boundaries and geographic characteristics, which the governments of these nations use to project power internationally. Since this is not the case for individuals, the people cannot possibly have “geopolitical” interests. By definition, therefore, geopolitical interests and the intricate question of their realisation are of concern to the State, not to the people. Thus, geopolitics is, by its very nature, a fundamentally undemocratic activity, conducted specifically by the State, in contradiction with the principles of representative government.[2]
There is, however, one exception to this rule: geopolitical interests of the lowest order, i.e. those related to the defence of the nation, are shared by the people. The people has the same interest as their government in realising such primary geopolitical interests; they seek security and protection, which, not coincidentally, was the original and only function of the early State. The monopoly of physical force is arguably the only monopoly that cannot be avoided in society; therefore, the provision of security and protection of the people is the only legitimate function of the State.[3] Other geopolitical interests, i.e. those of a higher order, are not shared by the people; their realisation by the State cannot therefore be legitimate.[4] This reasoning is in line with the principles of the Charter of United Nations, which States that military force can only be used by a nation in order to exercise the right of defending itself against foreign aggression.[5]
Many modern nations only realise primary geopolitical interests, though not because they are committed to conducting an ethical foreign policy, but because they are unable to realise interests of a higher order. In theory of course, the divergence of interests between the State and the people then still exists, but it is not apparent in practice. Therefore, such nations have foreign policies that generally represent well the public interest in this regard. Because they are more constrained, the smaller and less powerful nations of the world, such as Austria, Sweden or Switzerland, are in this regard more democratic than the bigger and more powerful nations. The latter nations, such as the US, the UK or France, who often realise (or attempt to realise) interests of a higher order, therefore lead a foreign policy that is in conflict with the public interest. As Brzezinski put it, “democracy is inimical to imperial mobilization”.[6]
The example of the US may briefly illustrate this point. The United States has set up a huge military-industrial complex and hundreds of military bases around the world in order to realise its highest geopolitical interests of global control. It is doubtful, to say the least, whether these efforts of the US government are at all beneficial to the US people. Any benefit to the US people of this enormous military and surveillance bureaucracy is marginal and indirect at best.[7] On the contrary, there are many ways in which the foreign policy conducted by the US government is antagonistic to the interest of the US people.[8] As mentioned above, the same reasoning is valid for other nations, albeit in more subtle forms since they are geopolitically more constrained.
Despite this bleak reality, and though the public often shows a certain healthy distrust of government, there is still an implicit assumption that the people shares the State's geopolitical interests. As was seen above, this is not the case, and even the language of geopolitics confirms this. Indeed, semantically, there is no question that geopolitics belongs to the realm of the State alone. For example, terms also used in this essay, such as “nation,” “Europe,” and “Russia,” refer in geopolitics to the governing body of the particular society. Thus, by “the nation” is generally implied “the State” or “the government;” but certainly not “the people.” By the words “Russia” and “Europe” is usually meant, respectively, “the Russian government” and “the European Commission and the national governments in Berlin, London and Paris.” In a geopolitical context, these terms certainly do not mean the “Russian people” and “the peoples of Europe.” This is also clear from the fact that in foreign policy the names of the capitals, e.g. “Washington” and “Moscow”, can be used interchangeably with the names of the nations, “United States” and “Russia,” to mean the governments of these countries. To take another example, “the national interest” does not mean the “public interest”; it is largely used as a euphemism for “the interest of the State (specifically the three branches of government and certain parts of the State bureaucracy) and the interest of the leaders and largest shareholders of the country's most powerful corporations.” The same is valid with many other terms that are commonly used in geopolitical discourse.
Since the public also uses these words with the meanings presented above, it implicitly and often unwittingly accepts that they have no say in the foreign policy of their governments because they do not share the geopolitical interests of the State. However, the ruling parts of society are undoubtedly aware that their geopolitical interests are not shared by the people. Those who serve the State at the highest levels rely on a number of methods in order to maintain this inherently undemocratic status quo. The best way is simply to make use of the weaknesses of human nature. A general inclination for conservatism and tradition can be relied upon for the public's support of the established political system, simply because it is the existing system; the one with which the people is familiar.
Additionally, a quite natural sense of patriotism is also very useful in order to align the interests of the people with the interests of the State. Patriotism is often encouraged by the government and the military in order to gain the support of the people for the realisation of the “nation”'s geopolitical interests (e.g. what is called in the US to “rally 'round the flag”). It is no coincidence that patriotic feeling is so strong in the United States, the country whose State has gone farthest in the realisation of its geopolitical interests. Indeed, in the US patriotic fervour is often whipped up when needed. Patriotism can then take extreme proportions: not displaying the correct patriotic feelings (e.g. “Support our troops!”) and the correct patriotic attire (e.g. the flag on the lapel or on the porch), can at times have social consequences, such as being frozen out of the community, being passed over for promotion, etc.[10]
There is, therefore, usually little need for the government to communicate and explain much to the public about its foreign policy plans.[11] Indeed, geopolitical discussions are almost always held by politicians and high officials behind closed doors, keeping the involvement and consent of the people to a minimum. (For instance, this is the case with the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations.[12]) When it is impossible to be completely silent about the realisation of geopolitical interests, the docile mainstream media can be relied up to manage the information flow in the interest of the State. Indeed, it is generally difficult to find any serious and objective geopolitical analyses in the mainstream media.[13] The role of the mainstream media is also important in making sure the “right” geopolitical semantics is maintained. Geopolitical terms must continuously imply that the State is alone responsible for geopolitics, and that the people should not get involved because they do not understand it. Of course, the emergence of the Internet has weakened a little the effect of this kind of media control of the public. This is the reason the internet is perceived by the political and military establishment as a threat, and why many attempts to monitor and control it, technically and legally, are being undertaken by governments in a number of countries, as recent disclosures have shown.[14] Before the existence of the Internet, the only way for the layman to learn about the geopolitical interests of his “nation” and get a glimpse of what his government was doing to realise them, was to read specialised foreign policy magazines that most people hardly knew existed (and if they did, they did not have easy access to them).
To the annoyance of the State, sometimes none of the above methods work as hoped. Sometimes the people anyway opposes the realisation by the State of certain geopolitical interests, both military and commercial.[15] The State then usually tries to realise them anyway, by simply ignoring public opinion and relying on clever communication.[16] This has often worked reasonably well, not least since public opposition usually is only temporary; in the long term, it is often possible for the government to count on a high level of indifference among the people towards question of geopolitics and foreign policy. Again, this public indifference is not particularly surprising, since geopolitical interests are not shared by the people.
There is an obvious reason for this misalignment of geopolitical interests between the State and the people. Nations, as opposed to individuals, are defined by territorial boundaries and geographic characteristics, which the governments of these nations use to project power internationally. Since this is not the case for individuals, the people cannot possibly have “geopolitical” interests. By definition, therefore, geopolitical interests and the intricate question of their realisation are of concern to the State, not to the people. Thus, geopolitics is, by its very nature, a fundamentally undemocratic activity, conducted specifically by the State, in contradiction with the principles of representative government.[2]
There is, however, one exception to this rule: geopolitical interests of the lowest order, i.e. those related to the defence of the nation, are shared by the people. The people has the same interest as their government in realising such primary geopolitical interests; they seek security and protection, which, not coincidentally, was the original and only function of the early State. The monopoly of physical force is arguably the only monopoly that cannot be avoided in society; therefore, the provision of security and protection of the people is the only legitimate function of the State.[3] Other geopolitical interests, i.e. those of a higher order, are not shared by the people; their realisation by the State cannot therefore be legitimate.[4] This reasoning is in line with the principles of the Charter of United Nations, which States that military force can only be used by a nation in order to exercise the right of defending itself against foreign aggression.[5]
Many modern nations only realise primary geopolitical interests, though not because they are committed to conducting an ethical foreign policy, but because they are unable to realise interests of a higher order. In theory of course, the divergence of interests between the State and the people then still exists, but it is not apparent in practice. Therefore, such nations have foreign policies that generally represent well the public interest in this regard. Because they are more constrained, the smaller and less powerful nations of the world, such as Austria, Sweden or Switzerland, are in this regard more democratic than the bigger and more powerful nations. The latter nations, such as the US, the UK or France, who often realise (or attempt to realise) interests of a higher order, therefore lead a foreign policy that is in conflict with the public interest. As Brzezinski put it, “democracy is inimical to imperial mobilization”.[6]
The example of the US may briefly illustrate this point. The United States has set up a huge military-industrial complex and hundreds of military bases around the world in order to realise its highest geopolitical interests of global control. It is doubtful, to say the least, whether these efforts of the US government are at all beneficial to the US people. Any benefit to the US people of this enormous military and surveillance bureaucracy is marginal and indirect at best.[7] On the contrary, there are many ways in which the foreign policy conducted by the US government is antagonistic to the interest of the US people.[8] As mentioned above, the same reasoning is valid for other nations, albeit in more subtle forms since they are geopolitically more constrained.
Despite this bleak reality, and though the public often shows a certain healthy distrust of government, there is still an implicit assumption that the people shares the State's geopolitical interests. As was seen above, this is not the case, and even the language of geopolitics confirms this. Indeed, semantically, there is no question that geopolitics belongs to the realm of the State alone. For example, terms also used in this essay, such as “nation,” “Europe,” and “Russia,” refer in geopolitics to the governing body of the particular society. Thus, by “the nation” is generally implied “the State” or “the government;” but certainly not “the people.” By the words “Russia” and “Europe” is usually meant, respectively, “the Russian government” and “the European Commission and the national governments in Berlin, London and Paris.” In a geopolitical context, these terms certainly do not mean the “Russian people” and “the peoples of Europe.” This is also clear from the fact that in foreign policy the names of the capitals, e.g. “Washington” and “Moscow”, can be used interchangeably with the names of the nations, “United States” and “Russia,” to mean the governments of these countries. To take another example, “the national interest” does not mean the “public interest”; it is largely used as a euphemism for “the interest of the State (specifically the three branches of government and certain parts of the State bureaucracy) and the interest of the leaders and largest shareholders of the country's most powerful corporations.” The same is valid with many other terms that are commonly used in geopolitical discourse.
Since the public also uses these words with the meanings presented above, it implicitly and often unwittingly accepts that they have no say in the foreign policy of their governments because they do not share the geopolitical interests of the State. However, the ruling parts of society are undoubtedly aware that their geopolitical interests are not shared by the people. Those who serve the State at the highest levels rely on a number of methods in order to maintain this inherently undemocratic status quo. The best way is simply to make use of the weaknesses of human nature. A general inclination for conservatism and tradition can be relied upon for the public's support of the established political system, simply because it is the existing system; the one with which the people is familiar.
Additionally, a quite natural sense of patriotism is also very useful in order to align the interests of the people with the interests of the State. Patriotism is often encouraged by the government and the military in order to gain the support of the people for the realisation of the “nation”'s geopolitical interests (e.g. what is called in the US to “rally 'round the flag”). It is no coincidence that patriotic feeling is so strong in the United States, the country whose State has gone farthest in the realisation of its geopolitical interests. Indeed, in the US patriotic fervour is often whipped up when needed. Patriotism can then take extreme proportions: not displaying the correct patriotic feelings (e.g. “Support our troops!”) and the correct patriotic attire (e.g. the flag on the lapel or on the porch), can at times have social consequences, such as being frozen out of the community, being passed over for promotion, etc.[10]
There is, therefore, usually little need for the government to communicate and explain much to the public about its foreign policy plans.[11] Indeed, geopolitical discussions are almost always held by politicians and high officials behind closed doors, keeping the involvement and consent of the people to a minimum. (For instance, this is the case with the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations.[12]) When it is impossible to be completely silent about the realisation of geopolitical interests, the docile mainstream media can be relied up to manage the information flow in the interest of the State. Indeed, it is generally difficult to find any serious and objective geopolitical analyses in the mainstream media.[13] The role of the mainstream media is also important in making sure the “right” geopolitical semantics is maintained. Geopolitical terms must continuously imply that the State is alone responsible for geopolitics, and that the people should not get involved because they do not understand it. Of course, the emergence of the Internet has weakened a little the effect of this kind of media control of the public. This is the reason the internet is perceived by the political and military establishment as a threat, and why many attempts to monitor and control it, technically and legally, are being undertaken by governments in a number of countries, as recent disclosures have shown.[14] Before the existence of the Internet, the only way for the layman to learn about the geopolitical interests of his “nation” and get a glimpse of what his government was doing to realise them, was to read specialised foreign policy magazines that most people hardly knew existed (and if they did, they did not have easy access to them).
To the annoyance of the State, sometimes none of the above methods work as hoped. Sometimes the people anyway opposes the realisation by the State of certain geopolitical interests, both military and commercial.[15] The State then usually tries to realise them anyway, by simply ignoring public opinion and relying on clever communication.[16] This has often worked reasonably well, not least since public opposition usually is only temporary; in the long term, it is often possible for the government to count on a high level of indifference among the people towards question of geopolitics and foreign policy. Again, this public indifference is not particularly surprising, since geopolitical interests are not shared by the people.
Notes:
[1] There are other reasons for not called modern nations “democratic”, but they are not connected with geopolitics and can therefore not be brought up here.
[2] Geopolitical interests are of course not the only interests that drive a nation's policy. Its geopolitical interests are an important subset of many national interests upon which the policies of its government are based.
[3] This is the concept of the State as “Night-watchman”. See for instance the thoughts of Frédéric Bastiat (e.g. “Avis à la jeunesse”, 1830), and for a more recent thinker, Robert Nozick (in “Anarchy, State and Utopia”, from 1974).
[4] This can also be seen in the often cited argument for US foreign interventions: what is invoked is the “threat to national security”. This is an implicit admission that this is precisely what the people are really and only concerned about.
[5] See www.un.org/en/documents/charter/. (See article 51). If this is too strict for any State to actually follow, at least then the less strict “doctrine” from the US, called the “Powell Doctrine”, also demands, in its first statement, that foreign aggression be linked with a risk to national security. It is from 1990, and named after Colin Powell.
[6] The full quote goes as follows: “Never before has a populist democracy attained international supremacy. But the pursuit of power is not a goal that commands popular passion, except in conditions of a sudden threat or challenge to the public’s sense of domestic well-being. The economic self-denial (that is, defense spending) and the human sacrifice (casualties, even among professional soldiers) required in the effort are uncongenial to democratic instincts. Democracy is inimical to imperial mobilization.” Z. Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard (Basic Books), p.35.
[7] Though it is true that US military installations around the United States, and private contractors and weapons manufacturers create jobs for the US people, this employment factor has been shown to be inefficient and limited. For instance, according to Robert Pollin, Professor of Economics at the University of Massachusetts in Amherst, public expenditure in education creates two and a half times as many jobs as the same expenditure in the military. See following interview on The Real News Network, June 9, 2013: therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=767&Itemid=74&jumival=10284
[8] The pursuit of these interests is very attractive to the civilian and military leaders of the military-industrial complex, as well as for the big egos of politicians and civil servants in Washington. But for most of the US population there is not much, if any, benefit. On the contrary, not only is the US population being spied upon by the NSA, not only are US soldiers being killed and wounded in faraway lands for geopolitical purposes, but the huge financial resources which could go to support urgent domestic needs are diverted away from those to which it really belongs: the US people. Further, the image of the US abroad is now so bad because of its foreign policy, that regular average US citizens suffer from this when they travel abroad.
[9] This has been done on a number of occasions, starting with US public opinion in WWI. See Edward Bernays' candid exposition: “Propaganda”.
[10] The treatment of US people of Muslim/Arab descent after 9/11, or of Japanese descent during WWII, are other examples of extreme proportion of patriotism.
[11] For example, the latest military conflicts initiated by the West generated very little debate or disclosure from the governments involved. Information often came after the act, which seemed acceptable to the people. Examples are NATO's attack on Libya, France's attack on Mali and Central African Republic.
[12] The TTIP, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, is a so-called “free trade agreement” being negotiated at top level between the US, Canada and the EU, with a minimum amount of exposure to or debate with the public (see article in below from Le Monde Diplomatique). The TPP, Trans-Pacific Partnership, is a ”a secret trade negotiation that has included over 600 official corporate "trade advisors" while hiding the text from Members of Congress, governors, state legislators, the press, civil society, and the public.” Sources:
www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2014/03/HALIMI/50200
www.exposethetpp.org/
[13] See instance, the following excellent analysis: Controlling the Lens: The Media War Being Fought Over Ukraine Between the Western Bloc and Russia, by Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya, March 14th 2014. Source: http://www.globalresearch.ca/controlling-the-lens-the-media-war-being-fought-over-ukraine-between-the-western-bloc-and-russia/5373364
[14] This is the case in most countries, also in the West, such as the UK, US, France, etc. For attempts to monitor Internet communication, see recent revelations by Edward Snowden, Glenn Greenwald and the Guardian newspaper. Further, a rare admission by a senior official about the threat of the Internet to the powers that be: when the current Secretary of State John Kerry said that "this little thing called the Internet ... makes it much harder to govern.". See article from Aug 13, 2013: www.cnsnews.com/news/article/john-kerry-little-thing-called-internet-makes-it-much-harder-govern#sthash.8FDQM59H.dpuf
[15] For instance, during the Vietnam war or before the Iraq War in 2003, as well as more (sometimes more localised) opposition to the realisation by the state of geopolitical interests of a commercial nature, such as trade agreements, etc. The EU treaties were sometimes rejected by voters, but this did not prevent the treaties to be signed anyway (for instance after another referendum was held). This was the case with Ireland for the treaty of Lisbon for instance (voted against in 2008, and then voted for in 2009).
[16] There are highly visible recent examples, the US war on Iraq in 2003, the NATO war on Libya in 2011, the French intervention in Mali and Central African Republic in 2012/2013, and many other less visible cases.
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