A Revised Definition of the Political System

A political system is generally characterized by its laws and institutions, in the broadest sense of these terms. However, this definition does not directly address the individual, who ought to be at the centre of politics.[1] To remedy this, the concept of "political system" could be extended to include also the impact of these laws and institutions on the individual, and more generally, on the entire society.[2]

The Two Meanings of the Good Life - Part III

It should be clear from the previous posts, that the classical “good life” is preferable to the modern “good life”. This is not only because of the intrinsically higher value of the classical “good life", but also because of the shortcomings of the modern definition. Man cannot live the “good life” if the main purpose of such a life is an ever-increasing accumulation of external and bodily goods. There might conceivably be an upper limit to the amount of wealth that can be generated for individual consumption, but more importantly, the lack of attendance to spiritual goods can eventually lead to a sense of despondency, not only for the individual but also for society as a whole. “Happiness” in the modern sense cannot be entirely satisfactory in the end, as many people often regretfully find out.

Though the classical definition of the “good life” is over two thousand years old, it is more sophisticated than the modern one. The modern definition of the “good life", which pervades today's Western societies, seems primitive and superficial in comparison. This observation is yet a confirmation that though materially rich, the modern world suffers from a certain spiritual and moral poverty. A society cannot possibly value the goods of the soul if it does not define the “good life” in the classical sense. What to say, then, about Western society that has largely forgotten the classical definition of the “good life”?

In the past, religion filled part of the gap that exists between the classical and the modern view of the “good life”. Societies in which most people prayed to God and read the Bible were societies which, to some extent, still valued spiritual goods. The legacy of Saint Augustine and Thomas Aquinas for many centuries upheld the Aristotelian definition of the “good life”. As the influence of the Church and the need for religion declined with the advent of modernity, this legacy was largely abandoned. As a result, the secular and materialistic modern societies have much weaker links with the spiritual goods than previous ones.

Yet, there are reasons to think that the classical definition of the “good life” could gain currency today. After all, the classical “good life” is secular, individualistic and hedonistic (though in a sophisticated sense) since it is concerned with reaching “happiness” for the self (in the form of eudaimonia). These are precisely the values that are cherished in the modern world. Further, the material conditions of modern societies seem far more suitable for the classical “good life” than the societies of the ancient world. Indeed, most people in the West today already have fulfilled the necessary external and bodily goods, and some attention could now be brought to spiritual goods. There are small signs that this might be the case, for instance in the popularity of Buddhism and spiritual self-help books.

But though the soil may be fertile in some areas, the seeds must also be planted and watered. The question is thus how modern society can be reminded of the existence of the classical “good life”. In order to change the perception of something as fundamental as the definitions of certain terms that are commonly used in society, the focus should be on early education. As Aristotle emphasised at the end of his Ethics, the principles of the “good life” should be taught already to schoolchildren.[1] They should become aware of what is the “chief good” of man, because, as Aristotle suggested, “will not the knowledge of it, then, have a great influence on life?”[2] An important civic task of teachers should therefore be to substitute the classical definition of the “good life” for the modern one in the minds of the young. Some of those seeds would then undoubtedly burgeon.

A successful rediscovery of the classical definition of the “good life” could have interesting political consequences. A wider recognition of the concept of the classical “good life” in the Western welfare society would mean putting the State's arrogated responsibility for the “happiness” of the people in some perspective. The State can claim an important role in providing “happiness” to the people when “happiness” is only thought to be the result of external and bodily goods. After all, modern nations all practice forms of State-capitalism: they have governments and public sectors that are deeply involved in providing a large array of such goods to the public; e.g. security, rule of law, infrastructure, utilities, environment, healthcare, banking, education, pensions, child and elderly care, etc. However, if the “good life", instead, were defined in the classical sense, where the “chief good” is eudaimonia, then the State would be unable to provide “happiness” to the people. The role of the State would be perceived very differently if it were confined merely to contributing to the necessary and basic requirements for the classical “good life”. The most important goods would then be spiritual goods, which could not come from the State since these goods can only be acquired by the individual, often in relationships with other individuals. The reintroduction of the concept of the classical “good life” in society would probably, therefore, raise questions about the size and role of the State in society and increase the acceptance of an open and competitive market in many sectors.

It follows that the modern Western State, therefore, has an inherent interest in preventing the classical view of the “good life” from become too widespread in society (or at least not encouraging it), as this would tend to undermine it. The legitimacy of the modern State rests not on providing internal and external security, for which just a fraction of its current size and budget are needed, but on being perceived by the people as indispensable for the provision all the goods (including services) that lead to “happiness” in the modern sense. Indeed, this perception of the role of the modern State has contributed to its continuous expansion since at least the end of the 19th century, at a local, national and supranational level. An even more chilling conclusion is that the modern State cannot have a strong interest in the moral and spiritual development of the people; quite the contrary. It might then not be so surprising that national education systems do not follow Aristotle's advice of including the classical “good life” in their curricula. It is well-known that the general education system is an effective instrument of social control; as John Stuart Mill said, it is a “mere contrivance for moulding people to be exactly like one another”.[3] The objective is, of course, to obtain productive young citizens who will question as little as possible the dominant value system.[4] An important such value that should not be questioned is the modern concept of the “good life”.

However, even if the dire reality described above could be remedied, the “good life” in the classical sense is not likely to ever become widespread. Such a life requires a dedication that cannot be expected of most people, regardless of the external conditions. What might be hoped for, however, is that the classical definition of the “good life” would become better known throughout modern society. Thus, the question should not be how people decide to live, but what is the highest ethical standard of society. To live up to a high standard is, by definition, rare; what is important is the existence of such a standard. In order for such an ethical standard to slowly spread in society, it is necessary to become aware that the modern definition of the “good life” is incomplete and should progressively be replaced with the classical meaning of this expression.

Notes: 

[1] Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book X.

[2] Aristotle, Nicomachean ethics, Book 1, chap. 2.

[3] J.S. Mill, On Liberty, p68. (Everyman’s Library, 1992.) In the same vein, H. L. Mencken also once said that the role for the education system was; “To make good citizens. And what is a good citizen? Simply one who never says, does or thinks anything that is unusual. Schools are maintained in order to bring this uniformity up to the highest possible point. A school is a hopper into which children are heaved while they are still young and tender; therein they are pressed into certain standard shapes and covered from head to heels with official rubber-stamps.” (see “H.L. Mencken at Full Throttle”, by Michael Dirda in his review of Mencken’s “Prejudices”, The Sunday Times, 29 November 2010). See also Murray Rothbard's brilliant essay on these problems, called Education : Free and Compulsary.

[4] See for instance, N. Chomsky, Lecture at the Istanbul Conference on Freedom of Speech, 20 October 2010 (available on Znet.org). 

The Two Meanings of the Good Life - Part II

The previous discussion suggests that it is necessary to consider not only material but also spiritual requirements in order to correctly define the “good life”. This is precisely what the classical definition of the “good life” does.

The “good life” in the classical sense consists in living in accordance with nature: any being is “good” if it does what it is most proper for it to do, if it uses its full natural potential. What is “good” for man is then not only what is pleasant and comfortable, but what is ultimately possible. It is not necessarily that which comes most easily, instinctively or “naturally” to man, but that which is most specific to human nature. Leo Strauss summarised the “good life” in the classical sense in the following way:

“The good life simply, is the life in which the requirements of man’s natural inclinations are fulfilled in the proper order to the highest possible degree, the life of a man who is awake to the highest possible degree, the life of a man in whose soul nothing lies waste. The good life is the perfection of man’s nature”.[1]

In the classics, the “good life” received perhaps its clearest and fullest expression in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics.[2] Aristotle identified three types of “goods” that man should acquire in order to perfect his nature: “bodily goods”, “external goods”,[3] and “goods of the soul”.[4] The most important are naturally the spiritual goods; they are the goods that can be considered, in Aristotle's words, “most properly and truly goods” because they are specifically human.[5] The two first types of goods are accessory goods; they are not “final ends", but they are necessary in order to attain the highest goods. Indeed, Aristotle fully understood that spiritual goods can only develop in a certain physical security and material comfort.[6] He said that man “needs the external goods as well; for it is impossible, or not easy, to do noble acts without the proper equipment”.[7] This idea was later adopted by anarchist thinkers like Mikhail Bakunin[8] and Rudolf Rocker, who said that:

“True intellectual culture and the demand for higher interests in life does not become possible until man has achieved a certain material standard of living, which makes him capable of these. Without this preliminary any higher intellectual aspirations are quite out of the question”.[9]

In order for man to fulfil his proper function, according to Aristotle, it is necessary to strive for the goods of the soul; that is, to strive for virtuousness.[10] To live virtuously means to develop the moral and intellectual virtues, such as gentleness, honesty, wisdom, intellect, and others. (Aristotle identified ten moral and five intellectual virtues).[11] This is not an easy endeavour of course; as Aristotle readily pointed out, there are many impediments to living virtuously,[12] and it requires efforts “not for some chance period but throughout a complete life”.[13] However, this does not mean the “good life” can only be reached at old age, because the “good life” in the classical sense is not so much an achievement as an activity.

As this classical “good life” is defined, man obviously cannot be fully “human” if he does not make efforts to acquire all three types of goods. Most people would admit that a sickly and unhealthy life in poor and wretched conditions can dehumanise a human being and even break his will to live. But not as many people see that humanity also requires the attainment of the third set of goods. As Aristotle said, “the mass of mankind are evidently quite slavish in their tastes, preferring a life suitable to beasts”.[14] A human life focused on the sensuous and material aspects of existence cannot, therefore, be said to differ much from an animal life.[15] Shakespeare expressed a similar thought when Hamlet saw the human need for spiritual goods: 

 “What is a man, If his chief good and market of his time
 Be but to sleep and feed? a beast, no more.
 Sure, he that made us with such large discourse,
 Looking before and after, gave us not
 That capability and god-like reason
 To fust in us unused”.[16]

 It becomes clear then, that in the modern definition of the “good life” only the first two kinds of goods are necessary for living the “good life”. It only proposes the realisation of the external and bodily goods. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the modern definition of the “good life” therefore seems to be a subset of, and a prerequisite for, the classical definition. The “good life” in the modern sense is incomplete because it lacks the important third part; it fails to consider the goods of the soul. When man lives the classical “good life” by striving for the moral and intellectual virtues, he develops an awareness of his material conditions from a historical and social perspective. Thus, the “good life” in the classical sense allows an individual to make those particular social comparisons without which the “good life” is next to impossible in the modern equalitarian welfare states.

The ultimate end of the “good life” is, as always, “happiness”. But which “happiness”? In the modern world, “happiness” comes, not surprisingly, from acquiring external and bodily goods, as per the definition mentioned earlier. This is the prevailing view of “happiness” as a temporary satisfaction of the senses, as a pleasant reaction to an improvement in material conditions. Of course, this view of “happiness” is not specifically modern at all. Already Aristotle pointed out that “all men think that the happy life is pleasant and weave pleasure into their ideal of happiness”.[17] What is called the “modern” definition of the “good life” is therefore in reality simply an inadequate  definition, because it only leads to a kind of “happiness” that fades and eventually disappoints. As Schopenhauer said, in the modern world, “no man is happy, he strives his whole life long after imaginary happiness, which he seldom attains, and if he does, then it is only to be disillusioned”.[18]

The classical meaning of “happiness” is, of course, very different from the modern one. The Greek term for “happiness” is eudaimonia, which is considered to be the “final end” of man.[19] It can be translated both as “well-being”, “living well”, “thriving”, and “flourishing”. There seems to be no such word in modern languages, and this in itself is a telling sign of where priorities lie today. “Happiness” in the sense of eudaimonia can only be attained if efforts are made to live the classical “good life”. According to Aristotle, eudaimonia is the highest good man can seek because it is “that which is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else”.[20]  Though a virtue is also “desirable in itself", it is also desirable “for the sake” of eudaimonia and cannot, therefore, be the “chief good”.[21] The morally and intellectually virtuous life is therefore a desirable life to live in itself and also for the sake of eudaimonia.[22] As the French thinker Pierre Hadot has pointed out, this is consistent with the classical view of philosophy as a way of life.[23]

There is another important difference between the modern and the classical perceptions of “happiness”. In the modern world, “happiness” is perceived as a state; at any moment one either is or is not happy. Similarly, the moral and intellectual virtues are seen as qualities: in the modern world one is seen to be either endowed with some of them or not.[24] For example, one man is deemed to be honest and another one wise. There is no concept, either in the case of “happiness” or in the case of the virtues, of any kind of process, such as “development”, “striving” or “thriving”. For the ancients, however, both “happiness” and the virtues were seen as “activities”.[25] As Aristotle said, spiritual goods are “achievable by action”,[26] they are not simply “states of character",[27] as they are often perceived in the modern world. In other words, in the classical view, a man can only be called, say, wise or honest if he acts in life with wisdom or honesty, if he strives to be wiser and more honest. This point again illustrates that “philosophy” in the classical world, as opposed to the modern world, was seen also as a way of living, an attitude to life.

This might explain why there is so little regard for the moral and intellectual virtues in the modern world. Attention to the goods of the soul is seen as relatively uninteresting because they are imagined to be innate “states of character”. In the modern view, only external and bodily goods are generally thought to be improvable through efforts; these are the areas in which efforts are perceived to be possible and necessary. This helps to explain, for instance, the contemporary popularity and even sometimes obsession, for bodily goods (in the form of sports, fitness, spa resorts, fitness clubs, yoga, diets, biological and health foods, etc.) and for external goods (in the form of security, welfare, investment plans, financial status, clothes, gadgets, cars, etc.).[28] Important external goods also include, as Aristotle pointed out, having friends, being treated with dignity, and getting respect.[29] These goods are also of high priority in the modern world, since they are thought to be essential for reaching “happiness”.[30] However, although all these goods do, indeed, contribute directly to “happiness” in the modern sense, in the classical view they are merely the foundation for the development of the virtues (if taken in moderation).[31] They cannot directly lead to eudaimonia.[32]

The frequent surveys that try to gauge “happiness", such as the UN World Happiness Report, of course do not give any information about eudaimonia. (Indeed, it should be difficult to survey the amount of eudaimonia in society.) These surveys merely tend to confirm the erroneous assumption that improvements in material conditions lead to lasting “well-being”. That these surveys always show that the safest, wealthiest and most peaceful, nations are the “happiest” in the world is consistent with the fact that these nations have been the most successful in letting their citizens acquire a continuous flow of new external and bodily goods. The acquisition of these goods does indeed lead to “happiness” according to the modern definition. It hardly needs pointing out, however, that the populations of these nations are not particularly known for their successful achievement of moral and intellectual virtues.

Nevertheless, there is a certain recognition today that “happiness” in the modern sense is unable to be fulfilling in the long term.[33] It is even sometimes acknowledged that the modern definition of “happiness” is far too skewed towards the fulfilment of material conditions, away from the classical definition.[34] For instance, the UN World Happiness Report admits that something is lacking in the modern way of looking at “happiness”:

“Aristotle spoke of virtue as the key to eudaimonia, loosely translated as “thriving”. Yet that tradition was almost lost in the modern era after 1800, when happiness became associated with material conditions, specially income and consumption”.[35]

In a way, it is understandable that material conditions are the most important criteria today for the “good life” and for reaching “happiness", in the modern meanings of these terms. Modern societies have been going through a sustained period of economic growth over several decades, and many people have seen their material conditions improve significantly. Economic growth often indirectly determines whether, for example, Mrs Jones will get a raise or Mr Smith will get hired. Such relative increases in standards of living lead Mrs Jones and Mr Smith to experience temporary surges in “happiness” as they increase consumption or savings (i.e. financial security). However, not only is such “happiness” transient and ultimately unsatisfactory, but economic growth is no longer assured today, at least in the West.[36] 

In such circumstances, the “good life” in the modern sense doesn't lead to “happiness", but to frustration. This is all the more reason why the classical definition of the “good life” should become more widely known. But then the modern definition of the “good life” should also be recognised as incomplete. Now that the classical meaning has also been reviewed, the final post will deal with the conclusions for the modern world.



Notes:

[1] L. Strauss, Natural Right and History, p127. The University of Chicago Press, 1965

[2] However, similar ideas can be found in the writings of the Buddha and his disciples, as well as in the medieval Catholic Church, through St Thomas Aquinas. Plato also raised the subject briefly in Gorgias, where Socrates maintained that the wicked and the undisciplined man is unhappy. See, for instance, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gorgias_%28dialogue%29 

[3] “External good” here refers not only to material conditions but also to other external aspects, such as honour, for example.

[4] “Now goods have been divided into three classes, and some are described as external, others as relating to soul or to body; we call those that relate to soul most properly and truly goods, and psychical actions and activities we class as relating to soul”. Aristotle, Nicomachean ethics, Book 1, chap. 8.

[5] Aristotle, Nicomachean ethics, Book 1, chap. 8.

[6] This is also the Confucian idea that poverty should be alleviated, or a certain standard of living assured, as a precondition for the development of moral or spiritual values. When external and bodily goods are limited and even insufficient, and no improvement in the amount or quality of these goods is possible or even imaginable, future expectations are also limited. It is then not possible to dedicate time and effort on the acquisition of spiritual goods. This was the situation for most people during most of the history of mankind. However, when external and bodily goods are sufficient and easily accessible, they are not enough in themselves for eudaimonia. External and bodily goods therefore perfectly fulfil the condition of being necessary but not sufficient for “happiness”.

[7] Aristotle, Nicomachean ethics, Book 1, chap. 8. Also, in order to live the “good life", Aristotle said that man must be “sufficiently equipped with external goods”. Aristotle, Nicomachean ethics, Book 1, chap. 10.

[8] Bakunin also expressed the same idea when he wrote: “Who are right, the idealists or the materialists? The question once stated in this way hesitation becomes impossible. Undoubtedly the idealists are wrong and the materialists right. Yes, facts are before ideas; yes, the ideal, as Proudhon said, is but a flower, whose root lies in the material conditions of existence”. M. Bakunin, God and the State, p1.

[9] R. Rocker, Anarcho-Syndicalism: Theory and Practice, p79. Working Classics Series, AK Press.

[10] Aristotle wrote: “...we state the function of man to be a certain kind of life, and this to be an activity or actions of the soul implying a rational principle, and the function of a good man to be the good and noble performance of these, and if any action is well performed when it is performed in accordance with the appropriate excellence: if this is the case, human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtue, and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and most complete”. Aristotle, Nicomachean ethics, Book I, chap. 7. 

[11] Moral virtues according to Aristotle: courage, temperance, liberality, magnificence, “greatness of soul” (magnanimity), ambitiousness, gentleness, friendship, honesty, being charming. (see Aristotle, Nicomachean ethics, Book III and IV. Source: classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.mb.txt) 
Intellectual virtues according to Aristotle: art, knowledge, practical judgement, wisdom, intellect.(see Aristotle, Nicomachean ethics, Book VI. Source: classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.mb.txt)

[12] See Aristotle, Nicomachean ethics, Book VII. Source: classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.mb.txt 

[13] Aristotle, Nicomachean ethics, Book I, Chapter 10. Source: classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.mb.txt 

[14] Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book 1, chap. 5.

[15] This kind of life may obviously vary in degree from an animal life, but not much in type. The classicist George Santayana expressed this idea as well: “reason is indeed not indispensable to life, nor needful if living anyhow be the sole and indeterminate aim; as the existence of animals and of most men sufficiently proves”. G. Santayana, The Life of Reason, p51. Prometheus Books, 1998.

[16] Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act 4, Scene 4.

[17] Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book VII, chap. 13. 

[18] A. Schopenhauer, The Emptiness of Life, Studies in Pessimism, Essays. 

[19] See, for instance, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eudaimonia 

[20] “Now such a thing happiness, above all else, is held to be; for this we choose always for self and never for the sake of something else”.Aristotle, Nicomachean ethics, Book 1, chap. 7.

[21] “If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this), and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for at that rate the process would go on to infinity, so that our desire would be empty and vain), clearly this must be the good and the chief good”. Aristotle, Nicomachean ethics, Book 1, chap. 2. “Now such a thing happiness, above all else, is held to be; for this we choose always for self and never for the sake of something else, but honour, pleasure, reason, and every virtue we choose indeed for themselves (for if nothing resulted from them we should still choose each of them), but we choose them also for the sake of happiness, judging that by means of them we shall be happy. Happiness, on the other hand, no one chooses for the sake of these, nor, in general, for anything other than itself”. Aristotle, Nicomachean ethics, Book 1, chap. 7.

[22] As Aristotle wrote in a famous passage: “The happy man lives well and does well; for we have practically defined happiness as a sort of good life and good action. The characteristics that are looked for in happiness seem also, all of them, to belong to what we have defined happiness as being. For some identify happiness with virtue, some with practical wisdom, others with a kind of philosophic wisdom, others with these, or one of these, accompanied by pleasure or not without pleasure; while others include also external prosperity. Now some of these views have been held by many men and men of old, others by a few eminent persons; and it is not probable that either of these should be entirely mistaken, but rather that they should be right in at least some one respect or even in most respects”. Aristotle, Nicomachean ethics, Book I, chap. 8. Source: classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.mb.txt)

[23] See Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life.

[24] Even the word “quality” is mostly used today instead of the word “virtue", which is not surprising since virtue refers etymologically to the way (or activity) of a man (vir).

[25] “It makes, perhaps, no small difference whether we place the chief good in possession or in use, in state of mind or in activity. For the state of mind may exist without producing any good result, as in a man who is asleep or in some other way quite inactive, but the activity cannot; for one who has the activity will of necessity be acting, and acting well”. Aristotle, Nicomachean ethics, Book 1, chap. 8. See also for instance, Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book IX, chap. 9 and 10.

[26] Aristotle, Nicomachean ethics, Book 1, chap. 7.

[27] As Aristotle wrote, making the distinction between states and activities: “Thus, in one word, states of character arise out of like activities. This is why the activities we exhibit must be of a certain kind; it is because the states of character correspond to the differences between these”. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book II, chap. 1.

[28] Regarding financial status, Aristotle said: “The life of money-making is one undertaken under compulsion, and wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is merely useful and for the sake of something else”. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book 1, chap. 5.

[29] Aristotle said regarding friends: “But it seems strange, when one assigns all good things to the happy man, not to assign friends, who are thought the greatest of external goods”. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book IX, chap. 9), and regarding honour: “Desert is relative to external goods; and the greatest of these, we should say, is that which we render to the gods, and which people of position most aim at, and which is the prize appointed for the noblest deeds; and this is honour; that is surely the greatest of external goods”. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book IV, chap. 3).

[30] These aspects are considered so important that they often get confused with spiritual goods.

[31] There is a fundamental problem, therefore, with the Lockean concept of “pursuit of happiness” which has become the credo of large parts of the Western world, not only in the United States. This expression only exists because “happiness” is perceived in the modern sense. Happiness in the classical sense is not something that can be directly pursued; it is a consequence of living the “good life” in the classical sense.

[32] “The answer to the question we are asking is plain also from the definition of happiness; for it has been said to be a virtuous activity of soul, of a certain kind. Of the remaining goods, some must necessarily pre-exist as conditions of happiness, and others are naturally co-operative and useful as instruments”. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book 1, chap. 9.

[33] As an example, see, for instance, “Meaning is Healthier than Happiness”, by Emily Esfahani Smith, The Atlantic, 1 Aug 2013. Source: www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2013/08/meaning-is-healthier-than-happiness/278250/ 

[34] From the six main factors in the UN Happiness report seen as having the biggest impact (75%) on “happiness” in the world (GDP per capita, years of healthy life expectancy, having someone to count on in times of trouble , perceptions of corruption, prevalence of generosity, and freedom to make life choices), four of them can be called part of the “material condition”, and all except “generosity” are what Aristotle call “external goods”, not “goods of the soul”. Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Happiness_Report , and http://unsdsn.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/WorldHappinessReport2013_online.pdf, see specifically Chapter 5, by Jeffrey D. Sachs. Further, the report states that “Even though social, psychological, and ethical factors are crucially important in individual happiness, public discourse and public policies tend to focus the lion’s share of attention on economics. The public is told, and generally believes, that the key to greater happiness is through more economic growth”. See UN 2013 World Happiness Report, Chapter 5, by See Jeffrey D. Saschs. Source: http://unsdsn.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/WorldHappinessReport2013_online.pdf 

[35] See in the UN 2013 World Happiness Report, Chapter 5, by See Jeffrey D. Saschs. Source: http://unsdsn.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/WorldHappinessReport2013_online.pdf 

[36] This is true at least since the financial crisis that started in 2007, though the impact to salaried workers go back further, to the early 70s. As is well known, for many reasons, purchasing power since the early 1970s has not been keeping up with productivity increases in the rich post-industrial world.

The Two Meanings of the Good Life - Part I

Expressions change over time, but not always for the better. Since modern societies are sometimes seen as containing the “collected reason of the ages”, to use Burke's famous phrase,[1] one could be forgiven for thinking that linguistic expressions only gain in nuance by embedding new meaning, never discarding any substance over time. Yet, the “good life”[2] is an example of an expression that in modern times has lost a significant part of its original, classical meaning. A look at the differences between these two definitions leads to some important conclusions about modern society.

Today, the “good life” is generally considered to be a comfortable, pleasant, and carefree life based on a certain standard of living. This is the modern meaning of the “good life”, based on life's material conditions. Thus, Herbert Marcuse defined the “good life” negatively, as “a life which is as much as possible free from toil, dependence, and ugliness”.[3] In this sense, the “good life” may never be available to all people all the time, but in the West it can certainly be said to be available to most people most of the time.[4] 

The “good life” in this modern sense is implicitly considered to be the kind of life that is conducive to “happiness”. In fact, this is a foregone conclusion since the word “happiness” is itself defined today in such a way that it could not be otherwise. Just as the “good life” has a specifically modern meaning, so does “happiness”. The United Nation's definition of “happiness”, which arguably could be taken as a reference, makes a clear distinction between the emotional feeling of being “happy” (which is more related with personality), and “happiness” as a level of satisfaction with external conditions.[5] Not surprisingly, with this definition of “happiness”, the countries with the highest standards of living also have the highest levels of “happiness”.[6] The modern definition of “happiness” is conveniently aligned with the modern definition of the “good life”.

However, it seems difficult to rely exclusively on material conditions for reaching “happiness”. The modern capitalist system thrives on a certain popular dissatisfaction with the existing level of goods and services.[7] The expectations of modern man constantly increase as standards of living improve; he constantly demands better conditions, whether a safer car, a cleaner environment, or more generous social services.[8] As José Ortega y Gasset said, “that which previously would have been thought to be good luck, or would have inspired humble gratitude to fate, has been converted into a right that one is not thankful of, but that one demands”.[9] Security and material comfort, which before the advent of the modern world could be only obtained with wealth and power, is now not only a reality for almost everyone in the West, but also seen as a “right”.[10]

For these reasons, it is not surprising that modern man generally does not think he is living the “good life”. Can someone really be said to live the ”good life” if he is constantly dissatisfied, expecting something more, and if he takes the conditions of his life for granted and sees them as a “right”? It seems that the “good life” requires not only a certain standard of living but also an awareness of that standard. A corollary to the modern definition should then be that for someone to live the ”good life” he must also know he is living the “good life”. In other words, he must be able to put it in perspective. The “good life” thus implicitly requires a comparison with another kind of life which, evidently, is not so “good”.[11]

However, such a comparison is not easy to make in the wealthy welfare states of the Western world, where the level of equality is high and material conditions do not vary much among the general population (as Gini coefficients make clear).[12] It is often difficult for an individual to recognise and appreciate a comfortable standard of living, far above the realisation of his primary needs, if this standard is generally shared by others in his vicinity. This helps to explain why many people in the West are not aware they are living the “good life”. Thus, paradoxically, a society in which nearly everyone is living the ”good life”, in effect is a society where almost no one is.

Other comparisons can be made, however. It is also possible to become aware of the ”good life” by putting it in historical and social perspective. Unfortunately, such remote projections also do not seem to be man's forte. Man does not have the natural reflex to compare his material situation with the dire conditions of past generations, or with the often difficult conditions of people currently living in less developed societies. Most people living in the rich Western world seem to take their current conditions for granted also in this sense; they are unaware of their outstanding standard of living, forgetting the uniqueness of their societies both from a historical point of view, as well as in the world today.

Such comparisons obviously require some kind of sensitivity to the historical and social conditions of mankind. A particular kind of imaginative understanding seems to be needed. Such a sensitivity requires, in John Dewey’s words, “a field of perception, rich in hues and subtle in shades of meaning”.[13] It consists in having a certain intellectual awareness; that sort of intellectual intuition which Plato called noesis and which he considered essential in enabling the thinking activity.[14] But such a consciousness is rare; experience shows that not many people are naturally endowed with such intellectual sensitivity. However, there should be no a priori reason why it could not be developed early in some men and women, providing it is part of their education.

The “good life” in the modern sense is therefore not as prevalent as it might initially seem; indeed, for the majority in the rich and developed world the ”good life” is hardly possible at all. Man's nature is such that material conditions gain a significant part of their value only if they are considered relatively. In the modern world, most people are unable to fully appreciate their comfortable material conditions because they are unable to put them in perspective. They are generally not aware that they are living the ”good life”, because they can or will not make the relevant comparisons.  Therefore, though there is some truth to definition of the “good life” in the modern sense, something is evidently missing from this definition. To see what this is, it is necessary to look at the older definition of the ”good life”, which will be the subject of the next post.

Notes: 

[1] From Edmund Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790).

[2] Equivalent expressions exist in some other languages, such as “la belle vie”, “la dolce vita”, “det goda livet”, etc.

[3] H. Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, p135. Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964.

[4] The United States may be somewhat an exception to this statement.

[5] As page 4 of the UN 2013 World Happiness Report states: “As we showed in last year’s World Happiness Report and again in this year’s report, respondents to surveys clearly recognize the difference between happiness as an emotion and happiness in the sense of life satisfaction”. Source: http://unsdsn.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/WorldHappinessReport2013_online.pdf 

[6] The UN World Happiness Index always shows the richest, cleanest and safest countries at the top of the list, year after year (i.e. Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Canada, Denmark, Netherlands, etc.). Source: http://unsdsn.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/WorldHappinessReport2013_online.pdf 

[7] It became necessary to “keep the customer dissatisfied", as Charles F. Kettering of General Motors famously wrote in 1929 (Kettering was General Director of Research Laboratories at General Motors from 1920 to 1947). See also, J. K. Galbraith's now classic, The Affluent Society (Penguin Books, 1999). He writes on p.128, for instance, that efforts were eventually made by business to “create the wants it seeks to satisfy”.

[8] See Professor B. Friedman, Moral Consequences of Economic Growth, Chapter 1. Further, Richard Easterlin, professor of economics at University of Southern California, says that previous generations have proven that our desires adjust to our income. At all levels of income most people usually estimate that they need about 20 percent more than they have in order to be “perfectly happy”. (Professor R. Easterlin, The Economics of Happiness).

[9] J. Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses, p111. (Austral, Edición Conmemorativa, 2005.)

[10] As in the “right” to “decent” housing or the “right “to “worthy” employment, and many others such “rights”.

[11] The national Gini coefficient, which measures income inequality in a country, is now generally below 30 for the welfare states of Western Europe. See, for instance, Eurostat (www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/qualityoflife/eurlife/) 

[12] L. Strauss, Liberal Education and Responsibility (essay). 

[13] J. Dewey, Experience and Nature, p315. Dover Publications, Inc., 1958. 

[14] Plato considered that such an intellectual intuition (noesis), together with discursive reasoning (dianoia), is what makes up the thinking activity (nous) of man.

The Corrupting Influence of Philosophy

At the risk of sounding redundant, I will repeat an old question: What is the use of philosophy? Seen from the point of view of another species, if one may be allowed such an absurd position, philosophy must seem like one of the more peculiar human activities.

Reflection is somewhat contrived and artificial when practised by the human being. It does not come naturally in man; significant efforts are required and the result is often far from impressive. As George Santayana said, it is difficult to overcome “the present with its instant joys in order laboriously to conceive the absent and the hypothetical.”[1] It is not surprising, therefore, that the spiritual foundations of modern civilisation were laid only relatively recently.[2] In the last two or three millennia, philosophy has spread slowly, indirectly influencing values and changing modes of thinking across society.

For the individual, this diffusion of philosophy cannot be said to have a positive influence, from either a physical or a spiritual point of view. Physically, the highest objective of life, besides mere survival, is the reproduction of the species and the accumulation of material wealth. Philosophy is not helpful in reaching these goals; on the contrary. As Rousseau famously said, reflection turns a man inward and philosophy isolates him.[3] This explains why many of the best thinkers never had children and were thus unable to fulfil the main biological duty of any living being: to beget an offspring.[4] The same principle can be seen at work in the general population, which is generally only indirectly exposed to philosophy. In the modern world, the influence of philosophy is at least partially responsible for the fact that the fertility rate in women is inversely correlated with their level of education.[5] There is also the movement of “voluntary childlessness”, which is followed mostly by highly educated men and women.[6] It would seem, therefore, that the more the human population engages in speculative and rational thinking, the less its members are inclined to procreate. Regarding material wealth, it is hardly necessary to comment on philosophy's poor capability in this respect. Reflection is hardly the most important factor for financial success.

From a spiritual point of view, the highest objective in life is peace and happiness. Here too, philosophy tends to make things more rather than less difficult. A thoughtful life is rarely a harmonious life. The best way to stay happy is to stay ignorant, like children. As Russian poet Alexander Griboedov said, there is "woe from wit."[7] Philosophy often troubles the soul; it has a disturbing tendency of stirring things up and stripping reality of its veneer. Reflection requires serious moments of solitude, “away from the market-place”, as Nietzsche said.[8]

It would seem, therefore, that philosophy is unnecessary and even counter-productive to the fulfilment of the most important physical and spiritual objectives of the human life. Philosophy is at best a useless activity, and at worse a harmful one for successful living.

Philosophy leads to a certain abnormality or ailment in the human soul when the individual is exposed to it directly. This spiritual sickness expresses itself as a morbid questioning of the world, destroying that innocent confidence that is so useful in life. Sometimes doubt is good, of course, because it increases the chances of survival. A healthy dose of natural scepticism is the basis for both individual and social development. But philosophy often generates a level of doubt that goes far beyond what the human mind generally is able to handle.

This may be one reason questions of philosophy are never settled. The same questions lead to different answers after thousands of years of ruminations, because the proposed answers are never universally satisfactory. The human being will always be fundamentally unprepared to conclusively answer questions that are so much wider in scope than daily life. The tragedy is that the human being has the intellectual capability of asking philosophical questions, but not the capability of answering them.

Political philosophy is a good example of this dilemma. This area of philosophy only exists because of the endless disagreements among some members of the human species regarding how society could or should be organised. Less intelligent species never had to deal with this problem: their members live naturally together in an implicit and instinctive social compact. The extreme intelligence of the human species has driven it away from the natural life, almost to the point of self-annihilation.[9] The Homo Sapiens seems to have been a step too far in the evolution of the human being; the Homo Erectus did not live in such confusion.

Since the exposure to philosophy can threaten individual well-being and social harmony, it is possible to conclude that there is such a thing as over-education. This is what the accusers of Socrates had in mind when they put him on trial for, among other things, “corruption of the youth.”[10] In this vein, today's policy recommendation would consist in reducing the intellectual education of society, for instance by limiting higher education to the natural sciences, and removing funding for those subjects that stimulate reflection, namely most subjects belonging to the humanities.[11] This is the dream of many educators and pundits, since the humanities are generally considered a waste of time and money in the capitalist society.[12] After all, economic growth is driven primarily by developments in the natural sciences.

A certain restriction or discouragement of higher education also makes sense because most professions do not require any serious thinking capability. The post-industrial service society requires a work-force consisting of simple-minded executers and quick-witted specialists, not thinking generalists.[13] The exposure to philosophy threatens the political stability of modern society because it kills the natural joy and happy insouciance of the majority. Several countries apparently recognise this and are trying, perhaps unwittingly, to limit access to higher education, for instance, by dramatically raising their university tuition fees and by letting the educational scores of their teenagers remain poor.[14]

However, the limitation of education for the good of society may not actually be needed, since reflection is far less common than is generally supposed. Most people never practice philosophy or even engage in any kind of sustained thinking. They are not worse off for it, since philosophy is not recommended for a successful life. As Santayana said, “reason is indeed not indispensable to life, nor needful if living anyhow be the sole and indeterminate aim; as the existence of animals and of most men sufficiently proves.”[15] Fortunately, most members of the human species remain happily insulated from most of the corrupting influence of philosophy. 



Notes: 

[1] G. Santayana, The Life of Reason, p9. Prometheus Books, 1998.

[2] From Wikipedia : Karl Jaspers argued that during the Axial Age "the spiritual foundations of humanity were laid simultaneously and independently in China, India, Persia, Judea, and Greece. And these are the foundations upon which humanity still subsists today.” (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axial_Age)

[3] J-J. Rousseau, On the Origin of the Inequality Among Men.

[4] For instance: Plato, Spinoza, Locke, Kant, Nietzsche, Santayana, Wittgenstein, Sartre, Foucault, and many others.

[5] See the article from The Guardian, “Should we care that smart women aren't having kids?”, by Sadhbh Walshe. www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/07/smart-women-not-having-kids. And the relation between education and childbirth: www.pewsocialtrends.org/2010/06/25/childlessness-up-among-all-women-down-among-women-with-advanced-degrees/

   
[6] From wikipedia: “Childless persons tend to have higher educations than those that do have children. Due to their higher education these childless couples also tend to have professional and managerial positions.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Childlessness

[7] "Горе от ума", Грибоедов.

[8] F. Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra. “Away from the market-place and from fame taketh place all that is great...” Chapter XII, p49.

[9] For instance with World War I and II (total 85M people), and later with the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, and the 1983 Soviet nuclear false alarm incident (see wikipedia: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1983_Soviet_nuclear_false_alarm_incident) 

    
[10] Plato, The Apology of Socrates.

[11] Something along these lines has already been suggested, for instance, by Bill Gates. See for instance: www.insidehighered.com/news/2011/03/01/gates_tells_governors_they_might_determine_public_university_program_funding_based_on_job_creation

[12] This argument is not so outrageous as it seems apparently, since it has been seriously proposed, for instance, by Jonathan Last, a senior writer at The Weekly Standard, that: “Among the solutions he advocates is cutting back on higher education, thereby reducing its depressing influence on American fertility.” See the The New Yorker, Head Count, by Elizabeth Kolbert, October 2013. www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/books/2013/10/21/131021crbo_books_kolbert?currentPage=all

[13] This well-known trait of the modern society was pointed out almost a century ago by thinkers such as John Dewey, José Ortega y Gasset, J. K. Galbraith, and others. Today it has just become clearer than before. For instance, J.K Galbraith: “The real accomplishment of modern science and technology consists in taking ordinary men, informing them narrowly and deeply and then, through appropriate organization, arranging to have their knowledge combined with that of other specialized but equally ordinary men.” J.K. Galbraith, The New Industrial State, p62, Hamish Hamilton publishers, 1967. 

    More recently, see the study of managers and salaried workers by Professor Robert Jackall, Moral Mazes: The World of Corporate Managers, Oxford University Press.

[14] This is the case, for instance, in countries such as the UK, the US, and Canada. See: www.theguardian.com/education/2013/oct/16/number-part-time-students-perfect-storm. In the UK, fees have triples under the Cameron government. A similar situation has been seen in Canada in the last 20 years: www.cbc.ca/news/canada/university-tuition-rising-to-record-levels-in-canada-1.1699103. For the situation in the US, here is the official data: nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=76.

    Regarding low educational scores, this trend is particularly clear in the US. See for instance, the following article which shows that education level of teenagers have not improved at all in 40 years: www.cato.org/blog/new-naep-scores-extend-dismal-trend-us-education-productivity and en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Programme_for_International_Student_Assessment#United_States

   
[15] G. Santayana, The Life of Reason, p51. Prometheus Books, 1998.

Finding Our Philosopher

Once at dinner party, I happened to mention how much I admired a particular philosopher. Not surprisingly, one of the persons with whom I had been speaking replied to me in a sarcastic tone: “How sweet!”; another, condescendingly: “I don’t believe I’ve ever had a favourite philosopher.” The insinuation was, of course, that since philosophy is above worldly matters, though we may have a favourite colour or a favourite car, we cannot possibly have a favourite philosopher. According to this view, to identify with any particular philosopher is to be intellectually limited. It is the idea that the thinker does not exist, however brilliant, who is important enough to be singled-out. However, such a position fails to consider the meaning and the importance of “finding our philosopher.”

The idea of having a “favourite philosopher” is based on the observation that each person has a particular way of relating to the world. Few would claim that people who have grown up in the same environment have identical world views. On the contrary, we immediately acknowledge from our own experience, that other minds, often to our chagrin, do not work exactly like our own. As George Santayana said, “we dye the world of our own colour,” and the contrast of this personal colour increases as our mind progressively grows in rational capacity.[1] Philosophers, therefore, often leave their own personal mark on their works. As William James said, “a philosophy is an expression of a man’s intimate character.”[2] The spiritual life has its root in the soul’s particular relationship with the external world.

There is undoubtely a certain constancy in the way thinkers develop and express their philosophy. Though the thoughts of most philosophers sometimes change direction, they are never completely transformed over the course of their lives. Rather, as they mature they merely add flesh to their first skeletal constructions and expand their horizons to encompass new fields. Their fundamental view of the world is usually already apparent in their early efforts. Many first works, such as The Birth of Tragedy by Nietzsche or The Sense of Beauty by Santayana, already show the stylistic and the philosophic directions that these philosophers followed for the rest of their lives. Though philosophical investigations grow best in the rich soil of experience, they take their inspiration from an immutable inner source.

When we discover the ideas of thinkers, certain moral and philosophical concepts and the manner they are presented to us, instinctively appeal to us more than others. Some representations of the world just seem to ring truer to us than others. An individual is not drawn to all philosophic currents and to all philosophers to the same degree. He is attracted to the works of certain philosophers and less sensitive to those of others. It is natural that similar characters find similar ideas attractive. We may say then that our “favourite philosopher” is that thinker whose ideas we naturally accept because we instinctively know how close they are, in form and content, to our own.

To feel an affinity with a certain philosopher usually means, more generally, that we agree with a particular school of thought. But it goes further than that since our favourite philosopher represents the world in a way in which we ourselves would represent it, were we able to do so. Obviously, since no two individuals are exactly identical, nor live in exactly the same conditions, the ideas of our favourite philosopher can never be a perfect representation of our own thoughts. Nevertheless, discovering and absorbing the thought of our favourite philosopher is the closest we may ever come to seeing a faithful representation of our own implicit and unarticulated convictions about man and society.

It is important for the thinking person to “find his philosopher” because all intellectual speculation rests on, and largely consists of, attempts at representation of the individual world view. Philosophers are few but originality is limited in mankind; we might therefore assume that virtually everyone could have a favourite philosopher. By identifying him we might improve our self-knowledge, as our favourite philosopher paints a picture of our own view of the world. It should be valuable to know the one who can show us our inner beliefs. But this task is not an easy undertaking; far from succeding in finding our philosopher, we are usually unaware even of the existence of such a possibility.

There are means that we may use, to help us find our philosopher. We feel affinity not only with a particular philosophy but also with the particular person from whose character and inner processes this philosophy emerges. It is useful, therefore, for us to look at the lives of philosophers, since an individual’s life and actions are, at least to some extent, reflections of his mind. Though Spinoza and Leibniz were contemporaries, both their philosophies as well as the lives they led couldn’t have been more different. The same can be said, for instance, with regard to Russell and Wittgenstein. In order to identify one’s favourite philosopher, it is of interest therefore, not only to study the thoughts of philosophers, but also to read accessory literature of these thinkers, such as their biographies or their published letters.

To find our philosopher means, at a minimum, that we should become acquainted with the more influential of them. The search for our favourite philosopher necessarily therefore implies a learning process which consists in comparing the thoughts of many philosophers. It is a process whereby we study, weigh, and finally discard argumentations because we become convinced, upon reflection, that they do not exactly fit us, that they do not describe the world precisely in the way we see it. Though we may never know exactly who we are, at least we can repeatedly know who we are not. A person who has found his philosopher is therefore either very lucky or, more likely, has been persistent enough in his efforts to find him. Far from being intellectually limited then, he who has found his philosopher is more likely to be someone who has awoken intellectually.

Finding our philosopher is also difficult because the realisation of his existence is usually only perceived in retrospect. That is, a young person should have the desire to search for something that he doesn’t know exists. If, at some point, he is inadvertently exposed to a representation of his own view of the world, he must have enough presence of mind to become aware of the special feeling of kinship between this philosopher and himself. In sum, intelligence and diligence are not enough in order to find our philosopher; a kind of intellectual sensitivity is needed as well. It is that intellectual sensitivity (noesis) which, along with discursive reasoning (dianoia), Plato considered to be an essential part of the thinking process (nous). John Dewey described this intellectual intuition as “a field of perception, rich in hues and subtle in shades of meaning.”[3]

Philosophy cannot only be “thought” therefore, but should also felt and imagined; it cannot be successfully approached with a cold and purely analytical mind. We should resist the temptation of becoming too academic when dealing with philosophical questions. At the same time, we thereby inevitably become aware that this requirement discriminates the access to philosophy. This is why it should not be surprising to see how unphilosophic many intelligent minds can be. If they at times do not have the capability for speculative thought, it is because they lack, or perhaps have not developed, the appropriate intellectual sensitivity. Conversely, some form of philosophical inquiry may be possible to individuals of average parts who do possess this intellectual intuition.

Finding our philosopher is thus an essential part of our intellectual development. At a dinner party or any social event, there will naturally not be enough time or interest to discuss the ideas presented in this short essay, but that does not mean we should remain unaware of them. The search for a favourite philosopher is motivated by a desire to improve the self-knowledge upon which all philosophical speculation is based. It is a sign of intellectual maturity therefore, rather than intellectual limitation. But just as self-knowledge is a necessary though not a sufficient condition for the development of philosophy, finding our philosopher is obviously not enough. It is only a starting point which could hopefully lead to the birth of our own original ideas about the world.

Notes:

[1] G. Santayana, Interpretations of Poetry and Religion.

[2] W. James, A Pluralistic Universe.

[3] J. Dewey, Experience and Nature, p315. Dover Publications, Inc., 1958.

The Future or the End of History?

It would take a great deal of confidence, in these uncertain and changing times, to publish an article called "The Future of History." Yet, this is precisely what Francis Fukuyama has done in the Jan-Feb 2012 issue of Foreign Affairs.[1] It is a bold title since it not only places this article in the ideological path of his most famous work, “The End of History and the Last Man,” but it also suggests a fundamental departure from those ideas with which he is usually associated. History seen as a directional process with a past, a present and a future is a philosophical and historiographic concept. This article, though, is not really about the future of History, but more about the political future of the world, and in particular the Western world. Nevertheless, in order to understand this latest contribution and perhaps any article of Francis Fukuyama’s, it is necessary to understand what he meant by the “end of History.”

Anyone who is interested in the modern world should read “The End of History and the Last Man.” It is without a doubt one of the most influential political works of the last decades, even though it is based mostly on 19th century ideas. Indeed, since it is heavily endebted to Hegel and Nietzsche, “The End of History” can serve as a good introduction to these two highly influential thinkers. Both of them developed original ideas about the evolution of the individual’s place and consciousness in the modern society. The problem, however, is that Fukuyama’s interpretation of these ideas was sometimes doubtful, and this makes any subsequent analysis of current affairs through this prism also open to the same criticism. Perhaps the most important objection relates to the rosy and caricatural picture that he drew of the “liberal democracy.” However, before reviewing this point, it is necessary to first recall the main ideas.

Briefly, according to Hegel, History, seen as a process of continuous ideological and moral development, “ended” with Napoleon’s victory at Jena in 1806, because with it, the universal values of the Enlightenment had thereby spread to all advanced peoples of the earth. Fukuyama used this idea in order to propose that History in fact ended in 1991 after all major communist regimes had crumbled or changed: ideology was dead, “liberal democracy” represented the “end point of mankind's ideological evolution,'' according to Fukuyama. Underpinning this idea is the concept of “recognition” in the way Hegel saw this term.[2] The ancient and feudal societies were based on the Master and Slave dichotomy and have slowly disappeared over the last centuries. In the democratic era, more and more people have for the first time been able to satisfy their desire for dignity, for recognition – that human trait that Plato called thumos, or “spiritedness.”[3] Liberal democracy is, for Fukuyama, therefore unique: it is a system which has achieved democratic legitimacy by obtaining the recognition of its citizens. Conversely, the citizens of the “liberal democracy” have no longer any desire or reason to seriously confront each other or the state because society provides them with all necessary outlets for achieving recognition. Contrary to all previous societies, in the modern liberal democracy recognition can be obtained, for example, by achieving status through salaried work, by voting in fair elections, by succeeding in the capitalist business environment, or by becoming physically victorious in sports.

Before addressing the application of Hegelian "recognition" to modern society, it is necessary to look more closely at the term "liberal democracy." In reality, the societies that are called “liberal democracies” are often far from deserving the name. It is usually a euphemism for a very different political and economic reality. Most Western societies, not least the USA, have been characterised since approximately the 1940s, by a high degree of statism and rather than calling them “liberal democracies,” it may be more correct to say that they have implemented various versions of “state capitalism.” Neither from the point of view of classic liberalism nor from the point of view of a democratic ideal is it possible to say that those societies which are commonly called “liberal democracies” live up to the expectations inherent in these two words.

Yet, Fukuyama presented the “liberal democracy” as an almost flawless political system. Such thinking goes against all serious political philosophy, starting with Plato. In “The Republic,” the political system called “democracy”, or the rule of the people, was famously presented as just one of several possible systems and certainly not the best one. Further, it warned that democracy can easily degenerate into tyranny, not only because power corrupts, but because the masses are incapable of electing a just ruler. Paradoxically therefore, it is only by keeping in mind the imperfections of the democratic system that a certain acceptable level of democracy can be sustained. Thinkers like Alexis de Tocqueville, John Stuart Mill and George Santayana understood very well this fragile nature of democracy. It is important in the current discussion to remember Mill’s observation that even a democratically elected government can have complete legitimacy only in the eyes of the majority that elected it. Santayana said that constitutional democracy is not enough, in itself, to assure the survival of the democratic system; there must be an “instinct” of democracy in the people, that instinct which “assumes that, unless all those concerned keep a vigilant eye on the course of public business and frequently pronounce on its conduct, they will before long awake to the fact that they have been ignored and enslaved.”[4] Such precautions about the nature of democracy were conspicuously absent from Fukuyama’s major work. There are serious implications to such omissions; for democracy cannot be the end point of political struggle if inherent in the concept of democracy itself is the constant struggle to uphold it. Fukuyama was either ignorant of these aspects of the liberal democracy, or more likely, wilfully chose to be politically correct and not mention its dirtier sides.

In his latest article, Fukuyama does admit that there are threats to liberal democracies, but for him these threats seem only to be exogenous and new, in the form of “globalisation” and “the further development of technology.” These difficulties are real, of course, but can only be properly understood within the context of the innate weaknesses of the liberal democracy. Indeed, almost all the political, economic and social problems of today’s Western societies stem from the ignorance or disregard on behalf of the masses of these fundamental recommendations regarding democracy. The people’s lack of democratic scepticism and of political education is leaving unchecked the slow growth of undemocratic tendencies in many liberal democracies. It is possible to mention, for instance, the farcical US electoral system; where two business parties alternate in power by conducting expensive charade-like campaigns, during which candidates hardly even try to appear independent. Democracy was always far from perfect in the US, but was further undermined with the now infamous Supreme Court’s “Citizens United” decision of 2010 which allows corporations to spend unlimited amounts of money in political elections.[5] The situation in most other Western “democracies” is not much better. In Europe, it is standard procedure to circumvent the democratic process when the political and business establishment does not consider the people capable of making the “right” choice. This has often been the case with respect to the ratification of EU treatises, as well as, recently, when the Greek and Italian élites decided to change governments and implement radical economic reforms, with little regard for the will of the people.

To call an existing society a “liberal democracy” is to misrepresent and take for granted the level of liberty in this society. As Rousseau commenced The Social Contract; « l’homme est né libre, mais partout il est dans les fers ».[6] Liberty is always to some degree limited in society, since, as Hobbes observed, the social contract consists in giving up freedom for security. In this sense, taxation is also a form of state coercion but which is, if kept at “reasonable” levels, acceptable for most people. Liberal democracies often go further though; many of them are actively limiting individual freedoms by using the classic excuse of providing ever more protection, often against foreign “enemies.” In the USA, the so-called “War on Terror” has been used since 2001 as a pretext to curtail rights, and the latest National Defense Authorization Act now includes the possibility for indefinite military detention of US citizens without trial, also in the name of security.[7]

Fukuyama claimed, like many other mainstream political thinkers, that “liberal democracies” are fundamentally peaceful and tolerant. He says that “having supplied recognition, democracies tend to be peaceable and nonimperialist, and don't fight one another.” Yet, a quick survey of international events suggests that this is not the case: some of the most bellicose countries on earth are liberal democracies, as the recent military engagements of the United States, Israel or the UK show. The US and Israel have between them started or participated in scores of military conflicts in the last two decades. The number of casualties may today be smaller than before, but it would be naive to attribute this fact to an increase in empathy on behalf of political and military establishments. It is more likely related to the increase of the media coverage of conflicts and the evolution of weapons technology. Contrary to what Fukuyama believed then, a country’s military aggressiveness does not depend so much on its economic and political system per se, but more on its readiness, its interests and its capability to wage war. Thus, liberal democracies regularly get involved in military conflicts because they have significant economic and political interests to defend. For instance, as has been sometimes admitted, one of the main reasons the US has been waging war and building up military power in the Middle East for so long is the interest of controlling the world’s most important oil reserves.[8]

If liberal democracies do not attack each other it is because they have entered into the fold of US hegemony by aligning their economic and geopolitical interests with the only superpower. Integrated economies that are heavily dependent on trade with one another have also little interest in solving disputes by force, regardless of their political system. Conversely, it is precisely because of the importance of trade to the economies of almost all nations today, that modern conflicts are often waged on the economic rather than on the military level (as, for instance, the recent plan to ruin the Iranian economy by putting in place an embargo on Iranian oil exports[9]). It should be impossible to say, therefore, that liberal democracies only spread peace and tolerance; on the contrary, the actions of Western governments have shown that the competition for resources and the struggle for domination are alive and well, more than half a century after the establishment of the UN Charter. Fukuyama probably did not recognise this point because, apart from possible intellectual dishonesty, for him war was mainly the consequence of the desire for Hegelian recognition. Since, in his view, the liberal democracy satisfies the desire for recognition of all its citizens, it is a society that therefore does not engage in war, or at the very least, does not start it. The persistence of such a view is surprising considering the amount of evidence against it.

Further, Fukuyama assumed that liberal democracy “won” over ideological systems such as communism and fascism. From a literal point of view, such a statement seems simplistic and exagerated. A more truthful and precise way of putting it might be that, in the case of communism, the Soviet state failed largely due to internal economic collapse, which was partially brought about, not by something as abstract as the virtue of the liberal democratic ideal, but by something far more prosaic: the US military power resulting directly from state planning in Washington, using a defense budget of such size that it could only be generated by a capitalist system. Fascism, too, was not defeated militarily by liberal democracy since the victory over Germany in WWII would have been impossible without the sacrifice of the Soviet army on the Eastern front. More importantly, it is dangerous to believe that democracy can “defeat” fascism since, as was mentioned above, in the liberal democracy the erosion of democracy is a constant risk and the slide towards fascism is a constant temptation. For example, the corporatism, the indebtedness, and the war-mongering of the US government are obvious fascist traits, as John T. Flynn so clearly warned over half a century ago in “As We Go Marching.”

It is notable that ideology remains quite strong in the country which is the most “Western” of all, not only in terms of geography but also in terms of outlook: the United States. The capability of this “liberal democracy” to perceive communism as a threat to be annihilated, for instance with the aggressive escalation of the Cold War by the Reagan administration – not by the Soviets  – , clearly suggests that the liberal democracy can also evolve, like the societies it attempts to vilify (sic), under the yoke of ideology. Expressions such as Reagan’s “Evil Empire” of the 1980s or Bush’s “Axis of Evil” of the 2000s, are typical of an ideological state. Such terms obviously do not belong in a society where, according to Fukuyama, ideology has disappeared and reason prevails. For example, only a non-rational and ideological form of thinking among a large part of US civilian and military institutions could explain $600billion of spending on “Homeland Security” since 2001.[10] The political culture of the United States is heavily tinged by what might be called an ideology of uniqueness: “American exceptionalism”. This ideology expresses itself for instance in the “Manifest Destiny” and in the Puritan vision of the “Shining City upon a Hill,” and has its basis in the ideal of the Lockean “American way of life” which, as the phrase implies, cannot be realised anywhere else than in the United States.

Furthermore, if the liberal democratic system were always non-ideological as initially Fukuyama believed, it could not have “won” against another political system because it could not even have defined such a political struggle. That is, it is implicit in the term itself that liberal democracies, like the USA, can be to some extent “ideological.” In his latest article, Fukuyama now seems to agree with this view of the liberal democracy as also ideological; he mentions “the hegemony of liberal democratic ideology”, apparently in contrast with his earlier position. After having hailed the non-ideological nature of Western society in “The End of History,” he now calls for the emergence of a new ideology that will propose new solutions to the problems that he has identified. Unfortunately, this new-found belief in an ideology of the liberal democracy now leads him to focus on the question of “how?” (i.e. which means?), instead of the arguably more fundamental question of “what?” (i.e. which problems?) to solve in the liberal democracy.

In reality, though ideology does persist in some liberal democractic societies, the West is largely non-ideological today. It is well known that in many Western nations the importance of ideology has strongly declined since the end of the Cold War. As a result, the political parties of the traditional right and left of the political spectrum have clustered around the centre so as to become almost indistinguishable from each other, and the political message has drowned in the promotion of personalities, thereby both limiting the real political choice of the voters and at the same time confusing them.[11] Ironically, it would seem therefore, that contrary to Fukuyama’s view, the decline of ideology in the West has brought along with it a decline of democracy. Further, considering this development, it seems far more appropriate to call the typical Western society by its non-ideological name, by referring to the redistributive nature of its economic system: the Welfare State. In his latest article, however, Fukuyama only sees welfare states as “big, bureaucratic and inflexible” and as products of ideological programmes of the left. A closer look at the most modern and successful welfare states though, such as the Nordic societies, shows that far from being based on rigid ideology, they are surviving splendidly, even in the current financial turmoil, thanks to their flexibility in adapting via reform and thanks to a utilitarian outlook that completely disregards ideology.

As was shown above, the liberal democracy is in many ways not fundamentally different from other, formally less democratic, political systems. The modern welfare state, though, is a far more unique society (though, in some cases, this term represents in fact just another side of the liberal democracy). In some welfare states there are no longer any major individual differences in pre-tax income, and classes have almost disappeared, not only economically but also socially. Progressive taxation and other social contributions have enabled a further reduction of socio-economic inequality.[12] Thus, on the one hand, in the welfare state significant individual distinction in the economic sphere is far more difficult than in other societies. On the other hand, thanks to the social safety net and the generous transfer payments, everyone can thrive in the welfare state, not only the fittest. Thus, it is more accurate to say that the welfare state - not the “liberal democracy” – comes closest to the state of society at the End of History, when the world would be one “universal and homogenous state”.[13] The unprecedent level of equality in the welfare state enables most members of this society to satisfy their desire for recognition for the first time.

With the advent of the modern welfare state, Hegelian recognition has been become generally available for all because the Master and Slave dichotomy has faded from society and has been made almost irrelevant. The citizens of the modern welfare state can be said to be Hegelian Slaves. Or, to be more precise, they are not Slaves any longer since there are no longer any Masters to whom they can be Slaves, but they have kept the Slave mentality. This mentality is expressed by three typical Slave traits of the modern welfare state: the importance of work specialisation, the obsession with physical security, and the faith in material progress. The welfare state will go to great lengths to make sure that as many “others” as possible are recognised because the Slave mentality implies the recognition of the “other”. Indeed, through the implementation of universal constitutional rights and equalitarian policies, in the welfare state it is possible to say that recognition has become almost generalised for the first time.[14] In the welfare state, a mutual recognition of all citizens comes as close as possible to being actually realised.

However, recognition is not perfect in this society either; there probably can never be “universal recognition”, even in the welfare state, and this is why it is impossible to say, as Fukuyama said, that the liberal democracy - is the “final form of human government.” As he hinted though, not everybody in this society is likely to be satisfied by the bland and general recognition that the welfare state provides; this is where Nietzsche’s distinction between the Superman and the Last Man becomes relevant. Some particular men and women are likely to try to find other means of satisfying their desire for recognition, for instance by engaging in different kinds of activities or perhaps simply by leaving this society. This reality is consistent with the conclusion above, namely that the liberal democracy is not the ultimate political system in the world; it is a society that is fundamentally incapable of satisfying the desire for recognition of all of its citizens.

Time has passed since the End of History was published. The last two decades have confirmed, if it was not clear earlier, that liberal democracy is not the panacea that Fukuyama made it out to be. The bloody Iraq war and the devastating financial crisis, to give two recent examples, both of which were started by the West, are probably very inconvenient for someone who has previously lavished such praise on the liberal democracy. Fukuyama is in a intellectually difficult position since he has been forced to make admissions while at the same time trying to make the current evolution of the world fit with his original views. A more accurate, and perhaps more candid, approach would be to state clearly that the economic and political conditions of the liberal democracy are far from perfect and can easily deteriorate, and that relatively authoritarian or more ill-managed societies can evidently also be successful in a wide range of areas. Fukuyama has had to acknowledge, at least implicitly, that liberal democracy is not, after all, the political system at the end of History; the title of his latest article makes this clear. History, of course, did not end either in 1806 or 1991, nor will it end until the world is controlled by a single government and social conflict has been eliminated for good. In other words, History will only end when the dream, or nightmare, of the Brave New World becomes reality.



Notes:

                          

[1] F. Fukuyama, The Future of History: Can Liberal Democracy Survive the Decline of the Middle Class?”, Foreign Affairs, January-February 2012, Volume 91, No. 1.

[2] Originally presented in G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of the Spirit, part B: Self-Consciousness, Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness: Lordship and Bondage. The concept of “recognition” of the “other” is the focal point of this reasoning, which was then restated in the twentieth century by A. Kojève (in Tyranny and Wisdom for instance). See for instance, L. Strauss, On Tyranny, Revised and Expanded Version, The University of Chicago Press, 2000. In F. Fukuyama, see The End of History and the Last Man, Chapters 16 and 17, Penguin Books, 1992.

[3] The human psyche could be assumed to be composed, as Plato said in The Republic (Book IV), of three fundamental parts. These parts are desire, reason and thumos (“spiritedness”), which can be described as man’s inherent urge to show his worth, to seek recognition and distinction, and his innate desire to be treated with dignity and respect. Thumos can be said to be a particular form of desire; one “whose object is not material but ideal.” (F. Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, p369, Penguin Books, 1992).

[4] G. Santayana, The Life of Reason, Chapter V: Democracy (1905 Edition).

[5] Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 08-205 (2010), 558 U.S. ––––, 130 S.Ct. 876 (January 21, 2010)

[6] “Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains.”

[7] The Patriot Act, signed one month after 9/11, has dramatically reduced restrictions on law enforcement agencies' ability to search telephone, e-mail, medical, financial, and other records. Regarding the National Defense Authorization Act, the statement refers to sections 1021 and 1022 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2012, signed by the US President Obama on Dec 31st 2011.

[8] See for instance:

“Greenspan admits Iraq was about oil, as deaths put at 1.2m”, The Guardian, Sunday 16 September 2007. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/sep/16/iraq.iraqtimeline

“McCain tries to clarify Mideast oil remark”, msnbc.com.

http://firstread.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2008/05/02/4423875-mccain-tries-to-clarify-mideast-oil-remark

[9] To get a glimpse of the increasing economic difficulties of the Iranian people resulting from the economic warfare of the West, see for instance, “Iran’s Middle Class on Edge as World Presses In”, The New York Times, Feb 6th 2012.  http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/07/world/middleeast/irans-middle-class-on-edge-as-international-tensions-rise.html?_r=1&ref=global-home&pagewanted=all

[10] See for instance, www.nationalpriorities.org/publications/2011/us-security-spending-since-911/

[11] For a typical example, see for instance the French Socialist presidential candidate François Hollande’s interview with the Huffington Post in January 2012. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alexandre-devecchio/francois-hollande-foreign-policy_b_1233735.html

[12] The national Gini coefficient, which measures income inequality in a country, is now typically below 30 for the welfare states of Western Europe. See Eurostat (www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/qualityoflife/eurlife/). The income equality in the Nordic welfare state, for instance, is such that differences even in pre-tax incomes for most professions are often found within a margin of only 15 percent around the average per capita income.

[13] Term used by Leo Strauss in the Strauss-Kojève correspondence, in Leo Strauss, On Tyranny (Revised and Expanded Version, The University of Chicago Press, 2000).

[14] As F. Fukuyama wrote, “The inherently unequal recognition of masters and slaves is replaced by universal and reciprocal recognition, where every citizen recognises the dignity and humanity of every other citizen, and where that dignity is recognised in turn by the state through the granting of rights.” F. Fukuyama, Introduction, The End of History and the Last Man.