The Illusion of "Free" Trade

The more common a term becomes, the more it is taken for granted and the less it is subjected to criticism. A case in point is the term “free trade”. These two words are so frequently seen next to each other, that little thought is given to what they really mean together. Is it reasonable to talk of “free” trade?

Trade is usually said to be “free” from an economic point of view, namely when there are no tariffs or subsidies that hinder or otherwise distort trade. With this definition there is clearly little “free” trade between nations, because most world trade is regulated by bilateral trade agreements which are not “free” in this sense. For instance, despite its name the so-called “North American Free Trade Agreement” (NAFTA) is not “free” since it defines tariffs on many goods that are exported and imported between the Canada, Mexico, and the United States.[1] In this conventional definition, therefore, “free trade” is a term that does not describe the real world, since international trade often does not meet these conditions. But it is possible to go further, because even in the rare occasions when these economic conditions are fullfilled, like within the European Union for instance, there are fundamental political reasons why trade still should not be called “free”.

Trade between nations cannot, in principle, be “free” if this word is considered in its negative meaning of “absence of constraints.”[2] Trade between two individuals can be called “free” if both these individuals are lucid and informed, consenting to trade with each other under fair rules, and no pressure is exerted by one over the other, or by any third party on either of them. From a philosophical point of view, this is of course never the case; an individual is always constrained, if only for biological reasons. But politically, and for all practical purposes, it can be said that there are conditions in which two such individuals can engage in “free” exchange. However, this is not true for trade between nations, because nations are not like individuals, for two main reasons.

Firstly, nation-states are far more complex than individuals. Unlike individuals, they must take into account myriad internal factors. Nations are constrained by innumerable domestic affairs which prevent them from trading “freely” with the rest of the world. To this argument it might of course be objected that government administrations largely act independently of the will of the people, even in democracies, especially with regard to international relations. Foreign and trade policy in particular traditionally transcends party lines; all parliaments, governments and high courts, regardless of their composition, are understandably committed to defending their countries’ particular interests on the international stage. Can anyone seriously state, for instance, that the people, whether in the developed or in the developing world, have had much influence on the WTO trade negotiations that have been going on for several decades? On the contrary, such decisions are often made on behalf of the nation by a small group of civil servants. Modern nations are usually governed by bureaucracies rather than by elected representatives of the people.

Nevertheless, despite these important objections, it does not seem possible to equate nations with individuals. A country’s public opinion and poll results cannot be entirely dismissed by government administrations, in particular when trade policy is seen as affecting local economies at home. Bureaucracies responsible for negotiating and setting trade policy cannot act entirely independently of society because they must take into account many different interest groups of varying degrees of influence. Nations are not atomic entities; unlike individuals, they are incapable of making politically independent and unconstrained decisions, not least with respect to trade. Thus, international trade should not called “free” because nations, as opposed to individuals, are obliged to consider numerous, often contradictory, claims and requests from a variety of sources when making decisions regarding trade.

The second reason world trade should not be called “free” is because the current international order is unjust. Political freedom, whether among individuals or nations, requires the rule of law. Since there is, to this day, no comprehensive and impartial international jurisprudence to which all nations are equally bound, trade can only really be “free” between equal nations; whose interests are aligned and complementary. Besides the obvious difficulty of assessing whether this is ever the case, the extreme diversity of nations makes such a situation unlikely. When nations are unequal, as is usually the case, when one is stronger than the other economically or militarily, trade becomes skewed. (In extremis, when one nation is far superior to the other, trade becomes a tribute payed by the weaker nation to the stronger one, such as often happened in feudal times.) Nations tend to interact with each other as individuals do in a “mafia” environment; that is, where “might makes right.” In such an environment, stronger nations naturally benefit more than weaker ones from trade, since they more easily impose their demands and obtain more favourable trade terms. In current times, the United States, by far the world’s biggest military and economic power, most enjoys such an advantageous trade position.

Thus, to sum up the preceding points, trade cannot be called “free” from a political perspective because nation-states are not like individuals, who in many circumstances are able to trade freely with each other. Firstly, nations have internal constraints that individuals do not. Secondly, nations are far from operating in the same kind of legal environment as citizens of modern nation-states. Freedom is first of all a political concept; “free” trade should therefore be defined not only economically as in the standard definition above, but also politically. These political considerations for international trade will now be illustrated using both historical and contemporary examples.

   
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The 19^th century after the defeat of Napoleon is often described as a time of “free” trade during which a benign Pax Britannica reigned over the world and assured the peaceful and “free” exchange of goods between all countries. Strong reservations must be made, however, regarding such a statement. The world was largely divided between a few big European powers and only a handful of countries were actually engaged in international trade; most other regions were trading on terms dictated by their colonial masters. At that time, trade was also far smaller than today; it has been estimated that international trade represented only one percent of global wealth in the 19^th century whereas today it amounts to more than 40 percent of world GDP. In comparison with the XXIst century, nation-states were then largely autarkic and world trade could therefore hardly be called “free” from any meaningful point of view.

Britain’s colonial domination and her control of the sea routes during this period assured favourable terms for the export of British goods. For instance, from the end of the 18^th century the British started to demand that India give up the production of cotton and instead import finished textiles from Britain.[3] The raw cotton was then sent to England where it was made into cloth in the mills of Manchester and Lancashire, before being shipped back and sold in India.[5] This decision was as beneficial to England’s industrialisation as it was detrimental to India’s development. So advantageous was this state of affairs for the United Kingdom that India was not allowed to set tariffs on cotton goods until 1917.[4] This is an example of how the stronger trading partner tends to benefit more from trade than the weaker one.

David Ricardo’s famous example of the trade of Portuguese wine for English wool should also be seen in this context. It is an interesting example since it has been used by economists to prove that “free” bilateral trade is beneficial for both countries when based on natural comparative advantages. However, economists often lack an understanding of history and politics. It is essential to have an idea of the geopolitical situation between Britain and the Iberian Peninsula in order to understand the actual trade relations between these countries. In fact, the progressive British military ascendancy over Portugal and Spain in 17^th and 18^th centuries gradually led, as expected, to tangible commercial benefits for Britain. Writer and journalist Eduardo Galeano wrote the following in his now classic work on the political and economic history of Latin America:

“Gold began to flow [from Brazil to England] at the same moment Portugal signed the treaty of Methuen, in 1703, with England. This was the coronation of a long series of privileges obtained by British merchants in Portugal. In exchange for her wines for the English market, Portugal was to open her own market and its colonies to British manufactured goods. Given the level of industrial development which existed at the time in Portugal, this measure meant the ruin of local manufacturing. It was not with wine that English cloth was to be bought, but with gold from Brazil, and as a consequence the nascent cloth industry of Portugal was paralysed. Portugal not only nipped in the bud its own industry but also destroyed the seeds for any other industrial development in Brazil. The kingdom prohibited the operation of sugar refineries in 1715; in 1729 it declared a crime the opening of new roads of communication in the mining region; in 1785, it ordered the burning of the Brazilian textile and thread mills.”[6]

This example of Spain and Portugal (and their former colonies) shows that to allow the unconditional import of goods from more developed countries can have disastrous social consequences that can last for centuries. Indeed, the value of the exports of these two countries still remains relatively small in the XXIst century. The Methuen treaty was evidently not a trade agreement between two equal partners within a system of rule of law, and can therefore not be considered “free” trade. England was able to industrialise partly at the expense of the development of Spain, Portugal, and its colonies, by making full use of a favourable balance of power with these countries.[7]

These historical examples are interesting because they clearly show to what extent nations try to turn political and military advantages into commercial ones. It is a general rule that should be evident to any honest student of international relations; namely that trade agreements are generally skewed by the political situation in which the trading partners find themselves at a given time. This is still the case today of course, though the modern world adds a layer of complexity. It is well known that most of the high value goods that are traded today depend only on conditions that can be acquired (such as education and infrastructure). However, the acquisition of these conditions is often difficult and costly. The high barriers to entry of many industries, such as the automobile or the pharmaceutical industries, means that it is important today not only to have a favourable geopolitical position, but also to be the first in as many sectors as possible. As a result, though the modern world creates significant opportunities, in this sense it also tends to entrench the political status quo. This “first mover advantage” helps to maintain the historical power relations between stronger and weaker nations, i.e. the intractable split between the North and the South.

A consequence of this idea is that protectionism can be recommended in the modern world. Indeed, “Global Trade and Conflicting National Interests”, an important work from 2000 by Professors R. E. Gomory and W. J. Baumol, supports this conclusion. They found that though some bilateral trade can be beneficial for both nations, there are many trade scenarios in which the national interests of two countries conflict with one another. The authors noted that, “It is often true that improvement in one country’s productive capabilities is attained only at the expense of another country’s general welfare.”[8] Using mathematical modelling, the authors showed what can often be grasped intuitively, namely that trade does not always benefit all involved parties. A nation may be worse off if it increases trade with a more industrialised and developed trading partner, rather than trying to limit its trade with this partner.

It can thus be in the interest of the weaker countries of the world to engage in protectionism. Protecting nascent industries and promoting their development until they are competitive enough to compete at internationally, may be a good strategy in some cases for emerging and undeveloped nations. On the other hand, this is precisely the reason why the deregulation of trade is generally supported by the richest and most developed countries. Indeed, the biggest proponents of “free” trade have long been the West; those nations which, due to their positions of relative economic and political strength with the rest of the world, have been (at least until recently) in the best position to profit from increased international trade.

The West, though, hasn’t always been so enthusiastic about global trade. The economist Ha-Joon Chang described in his excellent study, Kicking Away the Ladder, how trade policies of Western nations have changed significantly over time. The same countries that today officially support “free” trade all used protectionist measures in the past, when they deemed that their own recently founded industries had to be protected against foreign, and in particular British, competition. This was precisely the way in which for instance Germany and the USA were able to build up an industrial economy and become internationally competitive. As Chang wrote, “between the Civil War and the Second World War, the USA was literally the most heavily protected economy in the world.”[9] It should not be surprising, therefore, that the first support for “free” trade originated with British economists, such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo.

The European Union presents an interesting example in this discussion, since it is a historically rare case of unregulated trade between nations at very different stages of social and industrial development. The unhindered movement of goods and services within the European Union has enabled the strongest powers among the 27 EU members, in particular Germany, to benefit hugely from trade with the weaker and less developed ones. Germany has enjoyed huge current account surpluses, partly at the expense of other European countries which predictably have suffered from weak industrial output, large trade deficits and high levels of debt. The “free” trade environment in the EU has been beneficial mostly to the stronger nations, and has helped reestablish Germany as the dominant power in the region. As expected, for the weaker EU nations it is certainly far from clear that the increased “free” trade with Germany has had positive long term effects, in particular considering the major economic difficulties that they now are facing.[10]

Though the most developed nations understandably promote unregulated trade, at the same time they also discreetly contribute to distorting and regulating trade when they want to protect their own industries. Such protective measures include tariffs, of course, such as the EU and US tariffs on Chinese goods.[11] Subsidies are also a common tool used to distort trade when these nations cannot compete on price. Agriculture is a good example; the EU and the US have been heavily subsidising their agricultural sectors for decades. The Common Agricultural Policy, which subsidises European agriculture, consists of almost half of the entire budget of the EU, or around 50 billions euros per year.[12] Similar protection is given by the United States to its cotton and corn industries, both receiving billions dollars per year in subsidies. These policies have the effect of distorting world market prices and of denying access to Western markets for many of the world’s poor and emerging countries. In the name of “free” trade however, the EU and the US continue to demand that other countries, usually poorer ones, open up their markets to Western investment and trade. This is the main reason the latest “Doha” round of WTO trade negotiations has stalled for years.

The consequences of such trade policies can be devastating for weaker nations. In a surprisingly candid moment, former US president Bill Clinton confirmed in a mea culpa appearance in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in March 2010 that he had sacrificed the future of the Haitian society for the sake of US interests.[13] He confessed that, as president, he had deliberately chosen to give in to the demands of the rice farmers of his home state of Arkansas, as well as the IMF and World Bank, “conditioning access to foreign aid on Haiti dramatically cut its trade tariffs on imported US rice”. The customs duties that had protected Haiti’s domestic rice production were reduced from 50% to 3%. Not surprisingly, this trade policy decision by the Clinton Administration fatally undermined Haitian agriculture, made Haiti even more dependent on imported food and strongly contributed to the social and economic catastrophe that Haiti has been experiencing for the last decades.[14]

Despite what is often heard, therefore, “free trade” is an illusion. Trade is not “free”, neither from an economic nor from a political point of view. The reason for this lies not in the nature of international trade, but in the nature of the agents who engage in it. Nation-states do not trade “freely” with each other not only because it is not in their interest, but because they are inherently incapable of doing so. It is therefore utopian of the United Nations to wish for “a universal, rule-based, open, non-discriminatory and equitable multilateral trading system”[15], since, on the contrary, international trade between nation-states tends to be specific, discriminatory and inequitable. To claim that world trade is, or should be, “free” is an idea that has been promoted by the most developed nations. These countries support a largely unregulated international trade system under which tariffs and subsidies are acceptable only if they are in the interest of these very countries. This is the reality of international trade.

Notes:

[1] See, for instance, Mexico under NAFTA, by Timothy A. Wise, Director of the Research and Policy Program at the Global Development and Environment Institute, Tufts University.

[2] For a review of positive and negative liberty, see the classic essay from Isaiah Berlin, in “Four Essays on Liberty”.

[3] H.-J. Chang, Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective. Anthem Press, 2003. p.22-23.

[4] As T. S. Ashton wrote in Standard of Life of the Workers in England: "Instead of producing muslins, cambrics, and other goods of high quality for sale in Europe and in the United States, the factories of Lancashire were increasingly concerned with cheap caliceos for Indian and Far Eastern markets.", in Capitalism and the Historians, p136, by F. A. Hayek, editor.

[5] H.-J. Chang, Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective. Anthem Press, 2003. p53.

[6] E. Galeano, Las Venas Abiertas de América Latina, Siglo XXI de España Editores. The Treaty of Methuen was a military and commercial treaty signed between England and Portugal, which stipulated that no tax could be charged for Portuguese wines exported to England or English textiles exported to Portugal.

[7] E. Galeano, Las Venas Abiertas de América Latina, p24-25. (Siglo XXI de España Editores.). The treaty of Nanking of 1842 is another example, as H.-J. Chang shows in Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective. Anthem Press, 2003. p53-54.

[8] R. E.Gomory and W. J. Baumol, Global Trade and Conflicting National Interests, MIT Press, 2000.

[9] For instance: “The United States maintained weighted average tariffs on manufactured products of approximately 40–50% up until the 1950s, augmented by the natural protectionism of high transportation costs in the 19th century, “Kicking Away the Ladder”, p 17. See also, Ha-Joon Chang, “Kicking Away the Ladder”, post-autistic economics review, issue no. 15, September 4, 2002, article 3. http://www.btinternet.com/~pae_news/review/issue15.htm

[10] See, for instance, Spain, Debt and Sovereignty Stratfor June 12^th 2012,  http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/spain-debt-and-sovereignty/

[11] See, for instance, “Europe Investigates Chinese Solar Panels, Sept 2012, The New York Times, and “Backdating of Tariff Fuels Fight Over Chinese Tires”, Aug 2012, The Wall Street Journal.

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/07/business/global/eu-investigates-chinese-solar-panels.html?pagewanted=all

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444270404577609511581316168.html

[12] EU statement: “The overall cost to the European Union is about €53 billion а year. This is roughly 40% of the total EU budget. The CAP's share of this budget is constantly shrinking: from 71% in 1984 to an expected 39% in 2013.” (http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/faq/cost/index_en.htm)

 [13] “Clinton’s Confession”, S. Gallego-Díaz, El Pais/NYT/IHT, 16th April 2010.

 [14] Mr Clinton’s exact words in the Senate hearing were the following: “I have to live every day with the consequences of a decision of mine which may have been good for some of my farmers in Arkansas, but it has not worked. It was a mistake. I had to live everyday with the consequences of the loss of capacity to produce a rice crop in Haiti to feed those people because of what I did; nobody else.” See Education International website, Impacts of IMF Policies on National Education Budgets and Teachers, Richard Rowden, Education International Research Institute, July 2011. http://download.ei-ie.org/Docs/WebDepot/EI%20Study%20on%20IMF%20Policies%20and%20Alternatives.pdf

[15] United Nations General Assembly, 2005 World Summit. http://www.who.int/hiv/universalaccess2010/worldsummit.pdf

Finding Our Philosopher

Once at dinner party, I happened to mention how much I admired a particular philosopher. Not surprisingly, one of the persons with whom I had been speaking replied to me in a sarcastic tone: “How sweet!”; another, condescendingly: “I don’t believe I’ve ever had a favourite philosopher.” The insinuation was, of course, that since philosophy is above worldly matters, though we may have a favourite colour or a favourite car, we cannot possibly have a favourite philosopher. According to this view, to identify with any particular philosopher is to be intellectually limited. It is the idea that the thinker does not exist, however brilliant, who is important enough to be singled-out. However, such a position fails to consider the meaning and the importance of “finding our philosopher.”

The idea of having a “favourite philosopher” is based on the observation that each person has a particular way of relating to the world. Few would claim that people who have grown up in the same environment have identical world views. On the contrary, we immediately acknowledge from our own experience, that other minds, often to our chagrin, do not work exactly like our own. As George Santayana said, “we dye the world of our own colour,” and the contrast of this personal colour increases as our mind progressively grows in rational capacity.[1] Philosophers, therefore, often leave their own personal mark on their works. As William James said, “a philosophy is an expression of a man’s intimate character.”[2] The spiritual life has its root in the soul’s particular relationship with the external world.

There is undoubtely a certain constancy in the way thinkers develop and express their philosophy. Though the thoughts of most philosophers sometimes change direction, they are never completely transformed over the course of their lives. Rather, as they mature they merely add flesh to their first skeletal constructions and expand their horizons to encompass new fields. Their fundamental view of the world is usually already apparent in their early efforts. Many first works, such as The Birth of Tragedy by Nietzsche or The Sense of Beauty by Santayana, already show the stylistic and the philosophic directions that these philosophers followed for the rest of their lives. Though philosophical investigations grow best in the rich soil of experience, they take their inspiration from an immutable inner source.

When we discover the ideas of thinkers, certain moral and philosophical concepts and the manner they are presented to us, instinctively appeal to us more than others. Some representations of the world just seem to ring truer to us than others. An individual is not drawn to all philosophic currents and to all philosophers to the same degree. He is attracted to the works of certain philosophers and less sensitive to those of others. It is natural that similar characters find similar ideas attractive. We may say then that our “favourite philosopher” is that thinker whose ideas we naturally accept because we instinctively know how close they are, in form and content, to our own.

To feel an affinity with a certain philosopher usually means, more generally, that we agree with a particular school of thought. But it goes further than that since our favourite philosopher represents the world in a way in which we ourselves would represent it, were we able to do so. Obviously, since no two individuals are exactly identical, nor live in exactly the same conditions, the ideas of our favourite philosopher can never be a perfect representation of our own thoughts. Nevertheless, discovering and absorbing the thought of our favourite philosopher is the closest we may ever come to seeing a faithful representation of our own implicit and unarticulated convictions about man and society.

It is important for the thinking person to “find his philosopher” because all intellectual speculation rests on, and largely consists of, attempts at representation of the individual world view. Philosophers are few but originality is limited in mankind; we might therefore assume that virtually everyone could have a favourite philosopher. By identifying him we might improve our self-knowledge, as our favourite philosopher paints a picture of our own view of the world. It should be valuable to know the one who can show us our inner beliefs. But this task is not an easy undertaking; far from succeding in finding our philosopher, we are usually unaware even of the existence of such a possibility.

There are means that we may use, to help us find our philosopher. We feel affinity not only with a particular philosophy but also with the particular person from whose character and inner processes this philosophy emerges. It is useful, therefore, for us to look at the lives of philosophers, since an individual’s life and actions are, at least to some extent, reflections of his mind. Though Spinoza and Leibniz were contemporaries, both their philosophies as well as the lives they led couldn’t have been more different. The same can be said, for instance, with regard to Russell and Wittgenstein. In order to identify one’s favourite philosopher, it is of interest therefore, not only to study the thoughts of philosophers, but also to read accessory literature of these thinkers, such as their biographies or their published letters.

To find our philosopher means, at a minimum, that we should become acquainted with the more influential of them. The search for our favourite philosopher necessarily therefore implies a learning process which consists in comparing the thoughts of many philosophers. It is a process whereby we study, weigh, and finally discard argumentations because we become convinced, upon reflection, that they do not exactly fit us, that they do not describe the world precisely in the way we see it. Though we may never know exactly who we are, at least we can repeatedly know who we are not. A person who has found his philosopher is therefore either very lucky or, more likely, has been persistent enough in his efforts to find him. Far from being intellectually limited then, he who has found his philosopher is more likely to be someone who has awoken intellectually.

Finding our philosopher is also difficult because the realisation of his existence is usually only perceived in retrospect. That is, a young person should have the desire to search for something that he doesn’t know exists. If, at some point, he is inadvertently exposed to a representation of his own view of the world, he must have enough presence of mind to become aware of the special feeling of kinship between this philosopher and himself. In sum, intelligence and diligence are not enough in order to find our philosopher; a kind of intellectual sensitivity is needed as well. It is that intellectual sensitivity (noesis) which, along with discursive reasoning (dianoia), Plato considered to be an essential part of the thinking process (nous). John Dewey described this intellectual intuition as “a field of perception, rich in hues and subtle in shades of meaning.”[3]

Philosophy cannot only be “thought” therefore, but should also felt and imagined; it cannot be successfully approached with a cold and purely analytical mind. We should resist the temptation of becoming too academic when dealing with philosophical questions. At the same time, we thereby inevitably become aware that this requirement discriminates the access to philosophy. This is why it should not be surprising to see how unphilosophic many intelligent minds can be. If they at times do not have the capability for speculative thought, it is because they lack, or perhaps have not developed, the appropriate intellectual sensitivity. Conversely, some form of philosophical inquiry may be possible to individuals of average parts who do possess this intellectual intuition.

Finding our philosopher is thus an essential part of our intellectual development. At a dinner party or any social event, there will naturally not be enough time or interest to discuss the ideas presented in this short essay, but that does not mean we should remain unaware of them. The search for a favourite philosopher is motivated by a desire to improve the self-knowledge upon which all philosophical speculation is based. It is a sign of intellectual maturity therefore, rather than intellectual limitation. But just as self-knowledge is a necessary though not a sufficient condition for the development of philosophy, finding our philosopher is obviously not enough. It is only a starting point which could hopefully lead to the birth of our own original ideas about the world.

Notes:

[1] G. Santayana, Interpretations of Poetry and Religion.

[2] W. James, A Pluralistic Universe.

[3] J. Dewey, Experience and Nature, p315. Dover Publications, Inc., 1958.

The Future or the End of History?

It would take a great deal of confidence, in these uncertain and changing times, to publish an article called "The Future of History." Yet, this is precisely what Francis Fukuyama has done in the Jan-Feb 2012 issue of Foreign Affairs.[1] It is a bold title since it not only places this article in the ideological path of his most famous work, “The End of History and the Last Man,” but it also suggests a fundamental departure from those ideas with which he is usually associated. History seen as a directional process with a past, a present and a future is a philosophical and historiographic concept. This article, though, is not really about the future of History, but more about the political future of the world, and in particular the Western world. Nevertheless, in order to understand this latest contribution and perhaps any article of Francis Fukuyama’s, it is necessary to understand what he meant by the “end of History.”

Anyone who is interested in the modern world should read “The End of History and the Last Man.” It is without a doubt one of the most influential political works of the last decades, even though it is based mostly on 19th century ideas. Indeed, since it is heavily endebted to Hegel and Nietzsche, “The End of History” can serve as a good introduction to these two highly influential thinkers. Both of them developed original ideas about the evolution of the individual’s place and consciousness in the modern society. The problem, however, is that Fukuyama’s interpretation of these ideas was sometimes doubtful, and this makes any subsequent analysis of current affairs through this prism also open to the same criticism. Perhaps the most important objection relates to the rosy and caricatural picture that he drew of the “liberal democracy.” However, before reviewing this point, it is necessary to first recall the main ideas.

Briefly, according to Hegel, History, seen as a process of continuous ideological and moral development, “ended” with Napoleon’s victory at Jena in 1806, because with it, the universal values of the Enlightenment had thereby spread to all advanced peoples of the earth. Fukuyama used this idea in order to propose that History in fact ended in 1991 after all major communist regimes had crumbled or changed: ideology was dead, “liberal democracy” represented the “end point of mankind's ideological evolution,'' according to Fukuyama. Underpinning this idea is the concept of “recognition” in the way Hegel saw this term.[2] The ancient and feudal societies were based on the Master and Slave dichotomy and have slowly disappeared over the last centuries. In the democratic era, more and more people have for the first time been able to satisfy their desire for dignity, for recognition – that human trait that Plato called thumos, or “spiritedness.”[3] Liberal democracy is, for Fukuyama, therefore unique: it is a system which has achieved democratic legitimacy by obtaining the recognition of its citizens. Conversely, the citizens of the “liberal democracy” have no longer any desire or reason to seriously confront each other or the state because society provides them with all necessary outlets for achieving recognition. Contrary to all previous societies, in the modern liberal democracy recognition can be obtained, for example, by achieving status through salaried work, by voting in fair elections, by succeeding in the capitalist business environment, or by becoming physically victorious in sports.

Before addressing the application of Hegelian "recognition" to modern society, it is necessary to look more closely at the term "liberal democracy." In reality, the societies that are called “liberal democracies” are often far from deserving the name. It is usually a euphemism for a very different political and economic reality. Most Western societies, not least the USA, have been characterised since approximately the 1940s, by a high degree of statism and rather than calling them “liberal democracies,” it may be more correct to say that they have implemented various versions of “state capitalism.” Neither from the point of view of classic liberalism nor from the point of view of a democratic ideal is it possible to say that those societies which are commonly called “liberal democracies” live up to the expectations inherent in these two words.

Yet, Fukuyama presented the “liberal democracy” as an almost flawless political system. Such thinking goes against all serious political philosophy, starting with Plato. In “The Republic,” the political system called “democracy”, or the rule of the people, was famously presented as just one of several possible systems and certainly not the best one. Further, it warned that democracy can easily degenerate into tyranny, not only because power corrupts, but because the masses are incapable of electing a just ruler. Paradoxically therefore, it is only by keeping in mind the imperfections of the democratic system that a certain acceptable level of democracy can be sustained. Thinkers like Alexis de Tocqueville, John Stuart Mill and George Santayana understood very well this fragile nature of democracy. It is important in the current discussion to remember Mill’s observation that even a democratically elected government can have complete legitimacy only in the eyes of the majority that elected it. Santayana said that constitutional democracy is not enough, in itself, to assure the survival of the democratic system; there must be an “instinct” of democracy in the people, that instinct which “assumes that, unless all those concerned keep a vigilant eye on the course of public business and frequently pronounce on its conduct, they will before long awake to the fact that they have been ignored and enslaved.”[4] Such precautions about the nature of democracy were conspicuously absent from Fukuyama’s major work. There are serious implications to such omissions; for democracy cannot be the end point of political struggle if inherent in the concept of democracy itself is the constant struggle to uphold it. Fukuyama was either ignorant of these aspects of the liberal democracy, or more likely, wilfully chose to be politically correct and not mention its dirtier sides.

In his latest article, Fukuyama does admit that there are threats to liberal democracies, but for him these threats seem only to be exogenous and new, in the form of “globalisation” and “the further development of technology.” These difficulties are real, of course, but can only be properly understood within the context of the innate weaknesses of the liberal democracy. Indeed, almost all the political, economic and social problems of today’s Western societies stem from the ignorance or disregard on behalf of the masses of these fundamental recommendations regarding democracy. The people’s lack of democratic scepticism and of political education is leaving unchecked the slow growth of undemocratic tendencies in many liberal democracies. It is possible to mention, for instance, the farcical US electoral system; where two business parties alternate in power by conducting expensive charade-like campaigns, during which candidates hardly even try to appear independent. Democracy was always far from perfect in the US, but was further undermined with the now infamous Supreme Court’s “Citizens United” decision of 2010 which allows corporations to spend unlimited amounts of money in political elections.[5] The situation in most other Western “democracies” is not much better. In Europe, it is standard procedure to circumvent the democratic process when the political and business establishment does not consider the people capable of making the “right” choice. This has often been the case with respect to the ratification of EU treatises, as well as, recently, when the Greek and Italian élites decided to change governments and implement radical economic reforms, with little regard for the will of the people.

To call an existing society a “liberal democracy” is to misrepresent and take for granted the level of liberty in this society. As Rousseau commenced The Social Contract; « l’homme est né libre, mais partout il est dans les fers ».[6] Liberty is always to some degree limited in society, since, as Hobbes observed, the social contract consists in giving up freedom for security. In this sense, taxation is also a form of state coercion but which is, if kept at “reasonable” levels, acceptable for most people. Liberal democracies often go further though; many of them are actively limiting individual freedoms by using the classic excuse of providing ever more protection, often against foreign “enemies.” In the USA, the so-called “War on Terror” has been used since 2001 as a pretext to curtail rights, and the latest National Defense Authorization Act now includes the possibility for indefinite military detention of US citizens without trial, also in the name of security.[7]

Fukuyama claimed, like many other mainstream political thinkers, that “liberal democracies” are fundamentally peaceful and tolerant. He says that “having supplied recognition, democracies tend to be peaceable and nonimperialist, and don't fight one another.” Yet, a quick survey of international events suggests that this is not the case: some of the most bellicose countries on earth are liberal democracies, as the recent military engagements of the United States, Israel or the UK show. The US and Israel have between them started or participated in scores of military conflicts in the last two decades. The number of casualties may today be smaller than before, but it would be naive to attribute this fact to an increase in empathy on behalf of political and military establishments. It is more likely related to the increase of the media coverage of conflicts and the evolution of weapons technology. Contrary to what Fukuyama believed then, a country’s military aggressiveness does not depend so much on its economic and political system per se, but more on its readiness, its interests and its capability to wage war. Thus, liberal democracies regularly get involved in military conflicts because they have significant economic and political interests to defend. For instance, as has been sometimes admitted, one of the main reasons the US has been waging war and building up military power in the Middle East for so long is the interest of controlling the world’s most important oil reserves.[8]

If liberal democracies do not attack each other it is because they have entered into the fold of US hegemony by aligning their economic and geopolitical interests with the only superpower. Integrated economies that are heavily dependent on trade with one another have also little interest in solving disputes by force, regardless of their political system. Conversely, it is precisely because of the importance of trade to the economies of almost all nations today, that modern conflicts are often waged on the economic rather than on the military level (as, for instance, the recent plan to ruin the Iranian economy by putting in place an embargo on Iranian oil exports[9]). It should be impossible to say, therefore, that liberal democracies only spread peace and tolerance; on the contrary, the actions of Western governments have shown that the competition for resources and the struggle for domination are alive and well, more than half a century after the establishment of the UN Charter. Fukuyama probably did not recognise this point because, apart from possible intellectual dishonesty, for him war was mainly the consequence of the desire for Hegelian recognition. Since, in his view, the liberal democracy satisfies the desire for recognition of all its citizens, it is a society that therefore does not engage in war, or at the very least, does not start it. The persistence of such a view is surprising considering the amount of evidence against it.

Further, Fukuyama assumed that liberal democracy “won” over ideological systems such as communism and fascism. From a literal point of view, such a statement seems simplistic and exagerated. A more truthful and precise way of putting it might be that, in the case of communism, the Soviet state failed largely due to internal economic collapse, which was partially brought about, not by something as abstract as the virtue of the liberal democratic ideal, but by something far more prosaic: the US military power resulting directly from state planning in Washington, using a defense budget of such size that it could only be generated by a capitalist system. Fascism, too, was not defeated militarily by liberal democracy since the victory over Germany in WWII would have been impossible without the sacrifice of the Soviet army on the Eastern front. More importantly, it is dangerous to believe that democracy can “defeat” fascism since, as was mentioned above, in the liberal democracy the erosion of democracy is a constant risk and the slide towards fascism is a constant temptation. For example, the corporatism, the indebtedness, and the war-mongering of the US government are obvious fascist traits, as John T. Flynn so clearly warned over half a century ago in “As We Go Marching.”

It is notable that ideology remains quite strong in the country which is the most “Western” of all, not only in terms of geography but also in terms of outlook: the United States. The capability of this “liberal democracy” to perceive communism as a threat to be annihilated, for instance with the aggressive escalation of the Cold War by the Reagan administration – not by the Soviets  – , clearly suggests that the liberal democracy can also evolve, like the societies it attempts to vilify (sic), under the yoke of ideology. Expressions such as Reagan’s “Evil Empire” of the 1980s or Bush’s “Axis of Evil” of the 2000s, are typical of an ideological state. Such terms obviously do not belong in a society where, according to Fukuyama, ideology has disappeared and reason prevails. For example, only a non-rational and ideological form of thinking among a large part of US civilian and military institutions could explain $600billion of spending on “Homeland Security” since 2001.[10] The political culture of the United States is heavily tinged by what might be called an ideology of uniqueness: “American exceptionalism”. This ideology expresses itself for instance in the “Manifest Destiny” and in the Puritan vision of the “Shining City upon a Hill,” and has its basis in the ideal of the Lockean “American way of life” which, as the phrase implies, cannot be realised anywhere else than in the United States.

Furthermore, if the liberal democratic system were always non-ideological as initially Fukuyama believed, it could not have “won” against another political system because it could not even have defined such a political struggle. That is, it is implicit in the term itself that liberal democracies, like the USA, can be to some extent “ideological.” In his latest article, Fukuyama now seems to agree with this view of the liberal democracy as also ideological; he mentions “the hegemony of liberal democratic ideology”, apparently in contrast with his earlier position. After having hailed the non-ideological nature of Western society in “The End of History,” he now calls for the emergence of a new ideology that will propose new solutions to the problems that he has identified. Unfortunately, this new-found belief in an ideology of the liberal democracy now leads him to focus on the question of “how?” (i.e. which means?), instead of the arguably more fundamental question of “what?” (i.e. which problems?) to solve in the liberal democracy.

In reality, though ideology does persist in some liberal democractic societies, the West is largely non-ideological today. It is well known that in many Western nations the importance of ideology has strongly declined since the end of the Cold War. As a result, the political parties of the traditional right and left of the political spectrum have clustered around the centre so as to become almost indistinguishable from each other, and the political message has drowned in the promotion of personalities, thereby both limiting the real political choice of the voters and at the same time confusing them.[11] Ironically, it would seem therefore, that contrary to Fukuyama’s view, the decline of ideology in the West has brought along with it a decline of democracy. Further, considering this development, it seems far more appropriate to call the typical Western society by its non-ideological name, by referring to the redistributive nature of its economic system: the Welfare State. In his latest article, however, Fukuyama only sees welfare states as “big, bureaucratic and inflexible” and as products of ideological programmes of the left. A closer look at the most modern and successful welfare states though, such as the Nordic societies, shows that far from being based on rigid ideology, they are surviving splendidly, even in the current financial turmoil, thanks to their flexibility in adapting via reform and thanks to a utilitarian outlook that completely disregards ideology.

As was shown above, the liberal democracy is in many ways not fundamentally different from other, formally less democratic, political systems. The modern welfare state, though, is a far more unique society (though, in some cases, this term represents in fact just another side of the liberal democracy). In some welfare states there are no longer any major individual differences in pre-tax income, and classes have almost disappeared, not only economically but also socially. Progressive taxation and other social contributions have enabled a further reduction of socio-economic inequality.[12] Thus, on the one hand, in the welfare state significant individual distinction in the economic sphere is far more difficult than in other societies. On the other hand, thanks to the social safety net and the generous transfer payments, everyone can thrive in the welfare state, not only the fittest. Thus, it is more accurate to say that the welfare state - not the “liberal democracy” – comes closest to the state of society at the End of History, when the world would be one “universal and homogenous state”.[13] The unprecedent level of equality in the welfare state enables most members of this society to satisfy their desire for recognition for the first time.

With the advent of the modern welfare state, Hegelian recognition has been become generally available for all because the Master and Slave dichotomy has faded from society and has been made almost irrelevant. The citizens of the modern welfare state can be said to be Hegelian Slaves. Or, to be more precise, they are not Slaves any longer since there are no longer any Masters to whom they can be Slaves, but they have kept the Slave mentality. This mentality is expressed by three typical Slave traits of the modern welfare state: the importance of work specialisation, the obsession with physical security, and the faith in material progress. The welfare state will go to great lengths to make sure that as many “others” as possible are recognised because the Slave mentality implies the recognition of the “other”. Indeed, through the implementation of universal constitutional rights and equalitarian policies, in the welfare state it is possible to say that recognition has become almost generalised for the first time.[14] In the welfare state, a mutual recognition of all citizens comes as close as possible to being actually realised.

However, recognition is not perfect in this society either; there probably can never be “universal recognition”, even in the welfare state, and this is why it is impossible to say, as Fukuyama said, that the liberal democracy - is the “final form of human government.” As he hinted though, not everybody in this society is likely to be satisfied by the bland and general recognition that the welfare state provides; this is where Nietzsche’s distinction between the Superman and the Last Man becomes relevant. Some particular men and women are likely to try to find other means of satisfying their desire for recognition, for instance by engaging in different kinds of activities or perhaps simply by leaving this society. This reality is consistent with the conclusion above, namely that the liberal democracy is not the ultimate political system in the world; it is a society that is fundamentally incapable of satisfying the desire for recognition of all of its citizens.

Time has passed since the End of History was published. The last two decades have confirmed, if it was not clear earlier, that liberal democracy is not the panacea that Fukuyama made it out to be. The bloody Iraq war and the devastating financial crisis, to give two recent examples, both of which were started by the West, are probably very inconvenient for someone who has previously lavished such praise on the liberal democracy. Fukuyama is in a intellectually difficult position since he has been forced to make admissions while at the same time trying to make the current evolution of the world fit with his original views. A more accurate, and perhaps more candid, approach would be to state clearly that the economic and political conditions of the liberal democracy are far from perfect and can easily deteriorate, and that relatively authoritarian or more ill-managed societies can evidently also be successful in a wide range of areas. Fukuyama has had to acknowledge, at least implicitly, that liberal democracy is not, after all, the political system at the end of History; the title of his latest article makes this clear. History, of course, did not end either in 1806 or 1991, nor will it end until the world is controlled by a single government and social conflict has been eliminated for good. In other words, History will only end when the dream, or nightmare, of the Brave New World becomes reality.



Notes:

                          

[1] F. Fukuyama, The Future of History: Can Liberal Democracy Survive the Decline of the Middle Class?”, Foreign Affairs, January-February 2012, Volume 91, No. 1.

[2] Originally presented in G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of the Spirit, part B: Self-Consciousness, Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness: Lordship and Bondage. The concept of “recognition” of the “other” is the focal point of this reasoning, which was then restated in the twentieth century by A. Kojève (in Tyranny and Wisdom for instance). See for instance, L. Strauss, On Tyranny, Revised and Expanded Version, The University of Chicago Press, 2000. In F. Fukuyama, see The End of History and the Last Man, Chapters 16 and 17, Penguin Books, 1992.

[3] The human psyche could be assumed to be composed, as Plato said in The Republic (Book IV), of three fundamental parts. These parts are desire, reason and thumos (“spiritedness”), which can be described as man’s inherent urge to show his worth, to seek recognition and distinction, and his innate desire to be treated with dignity and respect. Thumos can be said to be a particular form of desire; one “whose object is not material but ideal.” (F. Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, p369, Penguin Books, 1992).

[4] G. Santayana, The Life of Reason, Chapter V: Democracy (1905 Edition).

[5] Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 08-205 (2010), 558 U.S. ––––, 130 S.Ct. 876 (January 21, 2010)

[6] “Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains.”

[7] The Patriot Act, signed one month after 9/11, has dramatically reduced restrictions on law enforcement agencies' ability to search telephone, e-mail, medical, financial, and other records. Regarding the National Defense Authorization Act, the statement refers to sections 1021 and 1022 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2012, signed by the US President Obama on Dec 31st 2011.

[8] See for instance:

“Greenspan admits Iraq was about oil, as deaths put at 1.2m”, The Guardian, Sunday 16 September 2007. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/sep/16/iraq.iraqtimeline

“McCain tries to clarify Mideast oil remark”, msnbc.com.

http://firstread.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2008/05/02/4423875-mccain-tries-to-clarify-mideast-oil-remark

[9] To get a glimpse of the increasing economic difficulties of the Iranian people resulting from the economic warfare of the West, see for instance, “Iran’s Middle Class on Edge as World Presses In”, The New York Times, Feb 6th 2012.  http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/07/world/middleeast/irans-middle-class-on-edge-as-international-tensions-rise.html?_r=1&ref=global-home&pagewanted=all

[10] See for instance, www.nationalpriorities.org/publications/2011/us-security-spending-since-911/

[11] For a typical example, see for instance the French Socialist presidential candidate François Hollande’s interview with the Huffington Post in January 2012. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alexandre-devecchio/francois-hollande-foreign-policy_b_1233735.html

[12] The national Gini coefficient, which measures income inequality in a country, is now typically below 30 for the welfare states of Western Europe. See Eurostat (www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/qualityoflife/eurlife/). The income equality in the Nordic welfare state, for instance, is such that differences even in pre-tax incomes for most professions are often found within a margin of only 15 percent around the average per capita income.

[13] Term used by Leo Strauss in the Strauss-Kojève correspondence, in Leo Strauss, On Tyranny (Revised and Expanded Version, The University of Chicago Press, 2000).

[14] As F. Fukuyama wrote, “The inherently unequal recognition of masters and slaves is replaced by universal and reciprocal recognition, where every citizen recognises the dignity and humanity of every other citizen, and where that dignity is recognised in turn by the state through the granting of rights.” F. Fukuyama, Introduction, The End of History and the Last Man.

In Defense of Intolerance

Recently, a neighbour asked me whether I was tolerant; of course, I answered that I was. A few hours later though, upon reflection, it struck me that the reason this question arose was that there may have been a suspicion from his side that I was not tolerant. Intolerance is perceived as unacceptable in our society and that is probably why I instinctively answered the way I did. Yet the more I thought about it, the more I became convinced of the need for intolerance.

Today in the West we think we all are tolerant. We are convinced we only know tolerant people, and that we live in tolerant societies. We are proud of our supposedly all-encompassing tolerance, i.e. our acceptance of everything, even that of which we disapprove. We seem to treat intolerance like a deadly disease; something to be eschewed at any cost. It is as if, since it is a word with the prefix “in”, we should feel towards “intolerance” like we feel towards “injustice” or “infamy”. We place such importance on tolerance that we forget the inherent paradox of tolerance: we are so tolerant that we do not tolerate intolerance.

When we hear the word intolerance today, we do not think it concerns us because it usually reminds us of religious intolerance and, more particularly, of intolerance of the Islamic kind. It is true that the question of tolerance originally referred to religion; specifically the tolerance of Jews and Protestants in 16^th century Catholic Europe. However, our first impressions regarding intolerance should not deceive us into drawing a conclusion that is too simplistic and even wrong. In other words, if we congratulate ourselves that we are so tolerant and if we insist on linking intolerance with religion, we will fail to perceive the importance of intolerance in our society and the benefit of intolerance in ourselves.

It is possible to define two different kinds of intolerance; political intolerance and what may be called “virtuous” intolerance. Political intolerance is that form of intolerance which is directed towards society, or part of society. It should be distinguished from virtuous intolerance which is intolerance at an individual level. Political intolerance can be seen in the strict sense as well as in the relative sense. In the strict sense, the importance of political intolerance can be quickly shown. If to be tolerant is the ability to accept everything, even that which one disapproves of, then it immediately becomes evident that all societies are intolerant, in particular the civil society. Since the civil society is based on the rule on law in order to assure security and protect private property, any violation of this rule, for instance in the form of murder, theft or fraud, should not only be disapproved of but also deemed unacceptable in this society and treated accordingly. In the strict sense then, civil society cannot be completely tolerant; on the contrary, its very existence requires that it also be politically intolerant.

The more intricate question is the consideration of political tolerance from a relative point of view. In this case, there are of course forms of political intolerance that should be lamented - if not outright condemned - in the tolerant society, notably the often misguided intolerance of the “other”. The intolerance of different groups or cultures, or of cultural and ethnic diversity within society, must inevitably be tolerated to some degree because man by nature tends to feel more comfortable with those individuals and groups that resemble him physically and culturally, than with those that do not. At the same time though, explicit xenophobia and racism should not be tolerated, not only because it is morally reprehensible, but because it is not in the interest of society or the individual. Indeed, such intolerance may often be pernicious to society and the individual, for instance by increasing inter-community tensions and violence. For example, the Nazi intolerance to Jews was unacceptable not only from a moral point of view, but also because it was not in the economic and social interest of the German society. The peaceful and tolerant co-existence of many diverse groups is often a sign of a strong, stable and confident society. Weak, unstable or insecure societies, on the other hand, often have more difficulty accomodating, accepting, and absorbing cultural or ethnic diversity. This may be the reason different groups in such societies are often perceived or presented by some as threats to national unity or development. Ironically, those who are intolerant to the “other” often also hold that their society is, or should be, strong and confident. The absurdity of their position is evident since by their intolerance they undermine their own political goals.

Political intolerance from a relative point of view should be seen as purely a result of convention. All civil societies, even the most progressive ones, are based not only on the rule of law, but also on custom. Custom dictates much of what the majority in society finds tolerable and intolerable (including also, to a certain extent, the aforementioned intolerance of the “other”). Thus the majority is tolerant of those deeds, attitudes and opinions that are customary, and intolerant of those that are not. It is possible to distinguish two types of such intolerable deeds, attitudes and opinions: those that are legal and those that are not. In the latter case, civil society establishes laws, rules, or regulations in order to punish what it is intolerant to. For instance, industrialised societies usually do not tolerate the exhibition of the naked body in public and often prosecutes such behaviour.

Indeed, illegal deeds, attitudes and opinions often depend on custom. When customs evolve, as they do quickly in a fast changing world, society may become tolerant to deeds, attitudes and opinions which it previously was intolerant to, and vice versa. The majority then each time loudly and openly congratulates itself how intolerant it has become to such and such new vice, or respectively, how tolerant it has become to such and such new virtue. There are many examples of the majority becoming intolerant where it was previously tolerant; e.g. capital punishment, smoking, the corporal punishment of children, Holocaust denial, or the short selling of stocks. In such cases, society makes illicit what it no longer tolerates. Conversely, there are also examples of the opposite situation; that is, of the majority becoming tolerant to deeds, attitudes and opinions which it before was intolerant to; e.g. communism, homosexuality, abortion, euthanasia, or the possession and consumption of certain drugs. In these cases, society decriminalises what it starts to tolerate. Thus at any given time, far from espousing only tolerance, in reality we find it perfectly acceptable that there are deeds, attitudes and opinions that are intolerable and illegal because they are not in accordance with the current custom of our society.

There are also deeds, attitudes and opinions which are legal but which society is intolerant to. This situation is more subtle than the previous one because this happens when the majority does not realise or does not admit that it is intolerant to deeds, attitudes or opinions of a minority. Intolerance of this kind is not loudly and openly proclaimed by the majority therefore, and this makes it difficult to detect. However, it is a quite common occurrence in all societies. An example of this intolerance is the frequent accusation in the USA that certain ideas are “un-American” when they do not correspond to a set of rather unclearly defined “American values”. This accusation is common in an environment that requires and rewards political correctness and sanctions deviant and original behavior, not least via peer pressure.[1] Reflexive intolerance is also evident when questions are raised for instance regarding the US relationship with Israel, regarding the actual need for security measures to protect the population against “terror”, or regarding the glaring omissions of the official report on the attacks of 9/11.[2] It is majority opinion that determines whether society is tolerant or intolerant. However, the majority can be feckle, irrational, and even plain wrong. There is therefore always an inherent danger, in any society, that the majority is intolerant to some deeds, attitudes and opinions that should be tolerated, not least because they are in the general interest of society.

The ideas of Herbert Marcuse are relevant in this respect. Marcuse noted that there are certain ideas which the majority is always intolerant to: those ideas which question the existing order of society. Like any organism, human society is not naturally prone to auto-criticism and will therefore tend to instinctively deny, or at least disregard, ideas that are intolerant of its prevailing order. For instance, the majorities in the welfare states of Europe are mostly intolerant to proposals for a radically different system of taxation and redistribution. Similarly, the majority and the mainstream media in the USA largely dismiss ideas which question a corporatist political order that favours entrenched vested interests. It is in the interest of society therefore, that the majority is unsuccessful in muffling such critical ideas, and even that it becomes tolerant to them. Thus Marcuse wrote in his 1965 essay “Repressive Tolerance,” that “the realization of the objective of tolerance would call for intolerance toward prevailing policies, attitudes, opinions, and the extension of tolerance to policies, attitudes, and opinions which are outlawed or suppressed.”[3]

The minority which expresses such aforementioned ideas should thus adopt an attitude of political intolerance towards what John Stuart Mill called the collective opinion, which the “tyranny of the majority” imposes, often inadvertently, on this minority.[4] The continued existence of an intolerant and sceptical minority, composed for instance of independent intellectuals, journalists, artists and writers, is thus essential to the tolerant society. Their intolerance is based on the fact that, as Leo Strauss noted, society is generally characterised more by opinion than by reason.[5] The individuals that belong to this minority are, therefore, by their inherent scepticism of majority opinion, the ultimate guardians of the tolerant society. Without them, without anyone rationally questioning the politically correct mainstream, society tends to become less tolerant and more slavish. We do our society a disfavour therefore, if we disregard the important role played by this politically intolerant minority.

This leads us to the other concept of intolerance, namely virtuous intolerance. For, in order for this minority to have some influence in society, the individuals that compose it must not only be politically intolerant. The men and women belonging to this minority should also develop another kind of intolerance in order to find the motivation to come together and exchange ideas. If they do not, they will be a minority only in number; that is, they will remain atomised and dispersed individuals whose lack of connection will limit their inspiration. They will have no common goals and they will be unable to reap the benefits of friendly Socratic dialogue: to test and polish their unexamined views. However, the need for the kind of intolerance that makes this possible is not often acknowledged and this perhaps helps to explain why many minorities are weak. The question then is how to practice such virtuous intolerance, since it is usually not contained in our education. We usually do not understand what this intolerance entails, since it is not promoted by society; most cultures and religions have traditionally focused on teaching tolerance (albeit quite unsuccessfully). In the modern secular world, we are implicitly taught that it is a virtue to be tolerant. Tolerance is seen, correctly, as fundamental for the existence of the pluralistic and peaceful society.

Considering the nature of man, tolerance can obviously never be universal. The more counter-intuitive point however, is that universal tolerance is not even desirable. If tolerance is a virtue, then the virtuous person should be tolerant. Yet, the virtuous person is not only an honest person of moral principle, but can also with reason be said to be a wise person who, in the Socratic tradition, makes efforts to improve himself in the search for truth. Such a virtuous person, or at least the person who strives to live virtuously, can never be fully tolerant of himself in the state he currently finds himself, if the object of the virtuous life is moral and intellectual development. The virtuous person must therefore at least practice a certain virtuous intolerance of himself.

In order to better understand this form of intolerance, we should start by conceding that even if we attempt to live virtuously, we cannot blame ourselves for those immutable weaknesses that Nature has given us. For instance, if we lack creativity or talent for music, or if we are not good with numbers, if we have an impulsive or shy disposition, we cannot hold that against ourselves. We should avoid being intolerant of faults and vices in ourselves that we cannot do anything about. However, we should not be tolerant of those of our shortcomings that depend on motivation and effort on our part. That is, virtuous intolerance consists in being intolerant of ourselves with respect to flaws in our person which we are able to soften with perseverance, and qualities that we are able to develop with diligence.

But it is necessary to go further. The person who is virtuously intolerant of himself should be intolerant towards that which he finds hinders him from living virtuously. Since man is a social animal, virtuous intolerance of the self necessarily leads then to some amount of virtuous intolerance of others as well. That is, he who is interested in practicing virtuous intolerance in himself cannot tolerate exactly to the same degree all persons and all circumstances. Indeed, he has an interest in not being tolerant of those persons and those circumstances which make it difficult or even impossible for him to live a virtuous life of moral and intellectual development. Such intolerance is required since, as Thoreau said, most social interactions consist mainly of  “hollow and ineffectual” conversation where “surface meets surface” and where intellectual depth is rarely encountered.[6] He should therefore gently and discreetly avoid certain persons and certain situations, not because he necessarily dislikes them or because they have done him harm, but because they distract him and bring him little value. Therefore, virtuous living in the Socratic tradition also requires virtuous intolerance in choosing carefully how and with whom we spend our time.

In the modern Western society, in which we have the time and the unprecedented opportunities to develop and improve ourselves, we should therefore be intolerant particularly of ignorance and laziness, because these are the two traits that are the least conducive to the virtuous life. These vices affect us both in ourselves and in others; they waste our time, they frustrate us, and they force us to compromise and to accept a lower standard. Though sometimes it may be unavoidable, there is no reason why we should always lower our own standard just because others have not made enough efforts to raise theirs. (Of course, a certain rejection of compromise can sometimes lead to minor difficulties, but this may have to be accepted.) If we tolerate philistines and sluggards, then we do not demand anything from them; we have low expectations of them. Tolerance is thus also in this case a form of condescension and depreciation of others. By tolerating the ignorant and the lazy, we seem to say that we do not expect them to ever become better than they currently are. To the person who does not practice virtuous intolerance, it seems satisfactory that others will never rise above mediocrity.

Many examples from every day life illustrate the interest in practicing virtuous intolerance and the obvious fact that few people do. Let us review one such example. For instance, though English is the default language of international communication in most of the world, the level is often surprisingly poor for many educated persons using English every day as a second language. Indeed, if a person is fluent in English and if he is tolerant, he is often forced to adapt the way he speaks or writes in order to be understood. He sometimes has to reduce the quality of his verbal or written communication for the sake of many people who, despite having had the opportunity, have not taken the time or the trouble to learn this language adequately. He is tolerant when he accepts to lower his standard of communication. He understands that other persons may not have had the motivation or priority to improve their knowledge of English. This example highlights clearly the need for virtuous intolerance. The excellent English speaker who practices virtuous intolerance refuses to lower his standard by degrading his own communication. That is, he practices intolerance by speaking English at his own level; he pays his interlocutors this compliment and he does not compromise. Obviously, this may lead in some cases to communication difficulties and possible misunderstandings, but these issues can be solved for instance by writing rather than speaking or by using a third party as go-between.

In conclusion, we may say therefore that society, i.e. the majority, should be politically tolerant of original and minoritary deeds, attitudes and opinions, but that the individual should practice virtuous intolerance towards what he believes is common, average and obvious. Unfortunately, too often the opposite is true: society tends to be politically intolerant, and individuals are generally not intolerant in the virtuous sense. Those who hold minority views have a particular interest in practicing virtuous intolerance. Though they are politically intolerant with regard to society, this is not enough; this minority will not be able to consolidate unless its members are also virtuously intolerant. Specifically, these men and women should discriminate their circle of acquaintances by preferring and seeking the company of like-minded individuals who will challenge them and give them the possibility to raise, not lower, their standard. Virtuous intolerance thus goes hand in hand with political intolerance because individuals who are politically intolerant to society need this kind of virtuous intolerance in order to form an efficient minority; so that their voices do not just drown in the senseless twitter of society. This is a prerequisite for the emergence of the intolerant minority that the tolerant society needs. Intolerance is not only a virtue in man therefore, but also a vital political necessity for the existence of the diverse and free society.

Notes:

[1]See for instance, “Students are expects to read books, not burn them” by Brendan O’Neill, 18 November 2010. (www.spiked-online.com/index.php/site/article/9905/)

[2] See for instance, "The 9/11 Commission Report: A 571-Page Lie", by Dr. David Ray Griffin, www.911truth.org.

[3] H. Marcuse, Repressive Intolerance.

[4] Mill warned, in an often quoted sentence, that there is a need for “protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them; to fetter the development, and, if possible, prevent the formation, of any individuality not in harmony with its ways, and compel all characters to fashion themselves upon the model of its own.” (J.S. Mill, On Liberty, p8, Everyman’s Library, 1992).

[5] L. Strauss, On a Forgotten Kind of Writing.

[6] H. D. Thoreau, Life without Principle.

The Dilemma of Modern Man

A modern man is a man who thinks he is modern. In other words, the modern era began when man became conscious of the unfolding of History. Initially, it was only a sort of negation of the past; a sensation, in a few educated men, of not being quite like the ancients. In the late 16^th century, the word “modern” was used for the first time in its current sense “of present or recent times”. For Gerhard Dohrn-van Rossum, Professor of Medieval and Early Modern History, a “fundamental change in time-consciousness occurred with the transition from an agrarian to an industrial society that began in the Middle Ages.”[1] This gradual change in the perception of Time that took place over hundreds of years is an important, though often overlooked, prerequisite for the development of the modern capitalist society.

For millennia, most men and women were directly living off the earth, their lives attuned to nature. In the pre-industrial society the concept of progress was unknown to most people. The world was seen as fluctuating slowly to repetitive, cyclical, and often predictable events; season followed season, peace followed war, and rulers came and went. George Santayana thus described the psyche of the ancient world: “the cycle of natural changes goes its perpetual round and the ploughman's mind, caught in that narrow vortex, plods and plods after the seasons”.[2] Time could not be measured accurately and this did not matter because the world was stable. Man was absorbed by the here and now, highly conscious of his present pains and recurring needs. This simple but natural sense of Time has now disappeared even in the most remote areas of the modern world.

In the last centuries, man has slowly acquired a linear sense of History, replacing the previous cyclical and recurrent outlook.[3] This process started in the 14th century with the invention of the sandglass and the appearance of the first mechanical clocks in the belltowers of Northern Italy. As the passage of Time for the first time could be accurately observed and measured, modern man began to perceive the world as a moving stream, never returning to a previous state. Many thinkers have described this change in outlook; C. Wright Mills, for instance, noted that:

“Most of us do not try to make sense of our age by believing in a Greek-like, eternal recurrence, … we believe with Burckhardt that we live in a mere succession of events; that sheer continuity is the only principle of history”.[4]

As a result, the present is no longer man’s sole preoccupation; the future has taken on far more importance. In the society of change, what comes next is of paramount importance. Man now speculates, plans, and thinks ahead as he never did before. Rather than living in the present, modern man, as Ortega y Gasset said, “irremediably has a futuristic constitution: he primarily lives in and of the future”[5]. For modern man, happiness is closely associated with the expectation of better things to come.

Material progress is therefore an inherent part of modern world. Friedrich von Hayek also recognised that “it is one of the characteristic facts of a progressive society that in it most things which individuals strive for can be obtained only through further progress”.[6] The modern state of progress in itself feeds the need for further progress. It is no coincidence that modern society is based on the capitalist system; it is the economic and political order that most efficiently delivers this required progress. In a society where increases in national, corporate and individual revenues are of highest priority, GDP growth is understandably the most important indicator of performance. Stagnation, which was the natural state of the world in previous times, is now seen as unacceptable.

Though this economic model has generated the greatest general increase in living standards in the history of mankind, it cannot, however, be entirely satisfying in the long run. Modern man cannot easily get a sense of fulfillment since he has a constant need for further gratification and since he usually prefers the stable and predictable to the changing and uncertain. As Schopenhauer said, in the modern world “no man is happy, he strives his whole life long after imaginary happiness, which he seldom attains, and if he does, then it is only to be disillusioned.”[7] The modern society is thus largely based, paradoxically, on the impossibility of ever attaining material and sensuous satisfaction. For modern man, in Leo Strauss’ words, “life is the joyless quest for joy.”[8]

This is the dilemma of modern man. On the one hand, he is not able to celebrate or enjoy his current material condition, nor is he completely at ease in a constantly changing society. [9] On the other hand, he cannot go back to the state of mind of his ancestors because the process of modernity is irreversable. It is not possible to “unlearn”: modern man is obliged to accept that he has a more sophisticated awareness of the world than his forebears. Since nature remains cyclical, the life of modern man is less in harmony with nature than before. Well-meaning environmentalists and anti-capitalists sometimes return to nature, but this return can only be physical, not mental, for they too are children of the modern world. Though most modern men and women usually do not articulate it, the often palpable malaise and frequent loss of bearings in modern society are symptoms of this problem.

The solution to this conundrum is not obvious because it cannot be found in the standard rational and deductive methods of modern man. Modernity cannot solve the problem of modernity. On the contrary, today’s increase in the rate of progress aggravates modern man’s predicament by taking him even further away from his natural state. The way out of the dilemma is first to become conscious of it. It is also necessary to realise that the modern cult of progress is mostly material and social, not so much moral and intellectual. Though it has been said before, it is worth repeating that the “good life” in the classical sense went far beyond the narrow materialistic meaning it has today. The recent surge in popularity of Eastern philosophies and practices, such as Buddhism, yoga, and meditation seem to indicate that this is understood by some.

It seems doubtful, however, that such spiritual efforts will ever bear fruit with more than a handful of people in society. Nevertheless, seen over hundreds or even thousands of years, the current turbulent period in the History of man could be merely a transitional phase to a more harmonious era. After all, the modern world is still very young and cultural and intellectual developments always lag behind material ones. It is possible to imagine, therefore, that mankind might eventually adapt successfully to the modern worldview. For instance, after many generations the human psyche might perhaps adopt a radically new sense of the future. Of course, such a solution to the dilemma of modern man might not be much of a consolation for the millions of unsatisfied souls living today.

Notes:

[1] G. Dohrn-von Rossum, History of the Hour, p2. (The University of Chicago Press, 1996).

[2] G. Santayana, The Life of Reason, p207 (Prometheus Books, 1998)

[3] F. Fukuyama, in The End of History and the Last Man, calls this the “coherent and directional” perception of History that is typical for the modern society.

[4] C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite, p22. (Oxford University Press, 2000)

[5] J. Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses, p241-242. (Austral, 1968 edition).

[6] F. A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, p42. (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960).

[7] A. Schopenhauer, The Emptiness of Life, Studies in Pessimism, Essays.

[8] L. Strauss, Natural Right and History, p.251. (The University of Chicago Press, 1965)

[9] For instance, Richard Easterlin, professor of economics at University of Southern California, says that at all levels of income most people usually estimate that they need about 20 percent more than they have in order to be “perfectly happy”.