In The
Ethics of Liberty (1982), Rothbard stated
that “the key to the theory of liberty is the establishment of the rights of
private property”. In the same work, he defined freedom as the “absence of
physical interference with an individual's person and property, with his
just property rights broadly defined.” In Man,
Economy and State (1962), he stated that “invasive
action may be defined as any action - violence, theft, or fraud - taking away
another’s personal freedom or property without his consent.” (italics added).
In this view, for society to be free, property
rights should not only be well defined, but they should also not be violated; an
impossible demand in any human society. Indeed, freedom is “taken away” when
the Non-Aggression
Principle (NAP) is violated, whether by the
state or anyone else. Professor Hoppe holds
this view as well, leading to an uncertainty about freedom even in a stateless society.
He writes:
“But wouldn’t it be possible under a
competitive system for a security producing firm to become an outlaw company—a
firm, that is, which, supported by its own clients, started aggressing against
others? There is certainly no way to deny that this might be possible,
though again it must be emphasized that here one is in the realm of
empirical social sciences, and no one could know such a thing with certainty.”
(italics added).
These two examples show that for both
Rothbard and Hoppe freedom depends on the NAP being upheld generally, because the
state is not the only source of “invasive
action” in society. Indeed, it is a truism to say that human society contains aggression
beside the state. But this recognition does make it necessary to consider “the
realm of empirical social sciences” and human psychology when studying the threats
to freedom. Though this goes beyond the scope of praxeology followed by
Austrian economics, libertarian political thought should consider the social,
psychological and historical contexts of freedom, as Mises and Rothbard did to a
large extent.
The Concept of Domination
Hanging over these thoughts is a general trait
of human societies that can be called “domination”, as when individuals or
institutions gain psychological or social ascendency over others and seek to exploit
it. This can lead to a violation of property rights, directly of course, but sometimes
only indirectly and with the passage of time.
For example, if an intellectual or media
elite imposes itself psychologically over a majority, no “invasive action” occurs
initially. However, over time this domination can alter public opinion and even
morality, ultimately resulting in widespread acceptance - and legal
codification - of increased state coercion. Or, if an individual is subjected to a regime of psychological
manipulation or social isolation by a dominant partner or local authority, no “invasive
action” occurs initially. Yet, over time, this domination can weaken the
individual's independent willpower, ultimately resulting in them being
manipulated into forfeiting their property without clear-eyed consent.
The concept of domination and theories of
power have been elaborated by both sides of the political spectrum. On the
conservative side, there is elite theory
but also George Santayana
in his last work, Dominations and Powers: Reflections on Liberty and Government
(1951). On the left, one of the more influential is Michel Foucault in lectures (Society Must be Defended, 1976) and in the History of
Sexuality (1976). Though these thinkers were very different, they described domination
in society in a similar way.
By domination Santayana meant the systems
of authority by which any society is held together, and the degrees of
compulsion, overt or disguised, by which that system is maintained. He used the
word in plural, because of the many types of domination: patriarchal, legal,
democratic, military, religious, commercial; each has its characteristic spirit
and method, its justifications and dangers. A society without domination is
inconceivable, because human desires and interests diverge, and compromise or
submission is often necessary to make social life possible.
Foucault
used the word “power” in society in a similar fashion, fleshing out the concept,
seeing it as diffuse and relational: “Power is exercised through networks, and
individuals do not simply circulate in those networks; they are in a position
to both submit to and exercise this power.” He specifically mentioned
that this is not related only to the state:
"By power, I do not mean
'Power,' as a set of institutions and apparatuses that guarantee the subjection
of citizens in a given State.… The analysis, in terms of power, should not
postulate, as initial data, the sovereignty of the State, the form of the law,
or the global unity of domination; these are rather its terminal forms.
By power, it seems to me that one should first understand the multiplicity of
force relations that are immanent to the domain in which they operate, and are
constitutive of their organization." (italics added).
These ideas inevitably recall Etienne
de la Boëtie, a thinker dear to libertarians, who also showed in Discourse of Voluntary Servitude (1552) that domination is not only the preserve of
the state; since “so many men… suffer under a single
tyrant who has no other power than the power they give him” (italics added). The Renaissance Frenchman also recognized the
importance of psychological compliance to power when he wrote that human beings
often accept to be ruled over, for they have "this
stubborn will to serve that would make one believe that indeed even the love of
liberty is not so natural.”
The State as an Expression of Domination
Though both Santayana and Foucault underestimated
the nefarious role of the modern state as the prime violator of property
rights, paradoxically, the state can be usefully and realistically described
through their lens of domination. Firstly, the state should not be considered
as sui generis; it
is an intrinsic part of society, and thus the “state versus society” dichotomy introduced
by Franz
Oppenheimer and Albert
Jay Nock needs far more nuance. Indeed, today
the state is deeply intertwined with society and, in some
areas, almost fused with it. Secondly, the
state is not an invariable monolith as it is sometimes depicted; on the contrary, it
has many layers, and a complex social and historical evolution, as was eruditely
described
by Profs. Bassani and Lottieri.
In this view, the state can be said to be a
concentrated expression of domination, and the modern state is then an extreme expression
of domination, or, as Foucault said in the quote above, a “terminal form”. Incidentally,
since domination is part and parcel of society and implicitly accepted as
natural by most of its members, this helps to explain why the modern state does
not elicit skepticism and rejection from most of its subjects.
The existence of domination in society
makes it clear that property rights will always be violated to some degree,
however well they are defined and recognized. This should bring the focus of
freedom back to the state, the only
entity violating property rights by using its monopoly of force over a
territory. A case can thus be made for adopting
a narrower and more political definition
of freedom : the absence of state
coercion. In this narrower definition, freedom increases as state power is
culled, but freedom does not decrease each time property rights are violated
somewhere.
The insights above suggest that there are
benefits to incorporating more explicitly the concept of domination into
Libertarian political theory and associating freedom specifically with state
coercion, not with the violation of property rights generally. This would also make
Libertarianism more accessible to the many youths who today are steeped in psychology
and social theory, and freedom would gain as a result.
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