The Two Meanings of the Good Life - Part I

Expressions change over time, but not always for the better. Since modern societies are sometimes seen as containing the “collected reason of the ages”, to use Burke's famous phrase,[1] one could be forgiven for thinking that linguistic expressions only gain in nuance by embedding new meaning, never discarding any substance over time. Yet, the “good life”[2] is an example of an expression that in modern times has lost a significant part of its original, classical meaning. A look at the differences between these two definitions leads to some important conclusions about modern society.

Today, the “good life” is generally considered to be a comfortable, pleasant, and carefree life based on a certain standard of living. This is the modern meaning of the “good life”, based on life's material conditions. Thus, Herbert Marcuse defined the “good life” negatively, as “a life which is as much as possible free from toil, dependence, and ugliness”.[3] In this sense, the “good life” may never be available to all people all the time, but in the West it can certainly be said to be available to most people most of the time.[4] 

The “good life” in this modern sense is implicitly considered to be the kind of life that is conducive to “happiness”. In fact, this is a foregone conclusion since the word “happiness” is itself defined today in such a way that it could not be otherwise. Just as the “good life” has a specifically modern meaning, so does “happiness”. The United Nation's definition of “happiness”, which arguably could be taken as a reference, makes a clear distinction between the emotional feeling of being “happy” (which is more related with personality), and “happiness” as a level of satisfaction with external conditions.[5] Not surprisingly, with this definition of “happiness”, the countries with the highest standards of living also have the highest levels of “happiness”.[6] The modern definition of “happiness” is conveniently aligned with the modern definition of the “good life”.

However, it seems difficult to rely exclusively on material conditions for reaching “happiness”. The modern capitalist system thrives on a certain popular dissatisfaction with the existing level of goods and services.[7] The expectations of modern man constantly increase as standards of living improve; he constantly demands better conditions, whether a safer car, a cleaner environment, or more generous social services.[8] As José Ortega y Gasset said, “that which previously would have been thought to be good luck, or would have inspired humble gratitude to fate, has been converted into a right that one is not thankful of, but that one demands”.[9] Security and material comfort, which before the advent of the modern world could be only obtained with wealth and power, is now not only a reality for almost everyone in the West, but also seen as a “right”.[10]

For these reasons, it is not surprising that modern man generally does not think he is living the “good life”. Can someone really be said to live the ”good life” if he is constantly dissatisfied, expecting something more, and if he takes the conditions of his life for granted and sees them as a “right”? It seems that the “good life” requires not only a certain standard of living but also an awareness of that standard. A corollary to the modern definition should then be that for someone to live the ”good life” he must also know he is living the “good life”. In other words, he must be able to put it in perspective. The “good life” thus implicitly requires a comparison with another kind of life which, evidently, is not so “good”.[11]

However, such a comparison is not easy to make in the wealthy welfare states of the Western world, where the level of equality is high and material conditions do not vary much among the general population (as Gini coefficients make clear).[12] It is often difficult for an individual to recognise and appreciate a comfortable standard of living, far above the realisation of his primary needs, if this standard is generally shared by others in his vicinity. This helps to explain why many people in the West are not aware they are living the “good life”. Thus, paradoxically, a society in which nearly everyone is living the ”good life”, in effect is a society where almost no one is.

Other comparisons can be made, however. It is also possible to become aware of the ”good life” by putting it in historical and social perspective. Unfortunately, such remote projections also do not seem to be man's forte. Man does not have the natural reflex to compare his material situation with the dire conditions of past generations, or with the often difficult conditions of people currently living in less developed societies. Most people living in the rich Western world seem to take their current conditions for granted also in this sense; they are unaware of their outstanding standard of living, forgetting the uniqueness of their societies both from a historical point of view, as well as in the world today.

Such comparisons obviously require some kind of sensitivity to the historical and social conditions of mankind. A particular kind of imaginative understanding seems to be needed. Such a sensitivity requires, in John Dewey’s words, “a field of perception, rich in hues and subtle in shades of meaning”.[13] It consists in having a certain intellectual awareness; that sort of intellectual intuition which Plato called noesis and which he considered essential in enabling the thinking activity.[14] But such a consciousness is rare; experience shows that not many people are naturally endowed with such intellectual sensitivity. However, there should be no a priori reason why it could not be developed early in some men and women, providing it is part of their education.

The “good life” in the modern sense is therefore not as prevalent as it might initially seem; indeed, for the majority in the rich and developed world the ”good life” is hardly possible at all. Man's nature is such that material conditions gain a significant part of their value only if they are considered relatively. In the modern world, most people are unable to fully appreciate their comfortable material conditions because they are unable to put them in perspective. They are generally not aware that they are living the ”good life”, because they can or will not make the relevant comparisons.  Therefore, though there is some truth to definition of the “good life” in the modern sense, something is evidently missing from this definition. To see what this is, it is necessary to look at the older definition of the ”good life”, which will be the subject of the next post.

Notes: 

[1] From Edmund Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790).

[2] Equivalent expressions exist in some other languages, such as “la belle vie”, “la dolce vita”, “det goda livet”, etc.

[3] H. Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, p135. Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964.

[4] The United States may be somewhat an exception to this statement.

[5] As page 4 of the UN 2013 World Happiness Report states: “As we showed in last year’s World Happiness Report and again in this year’s report, respondents to surveys clearly recognize the difference between happiness as an emotion and happiness in the sense of life satisfaction”. Source: http://unsdsn.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/WorldHappinessReport2013_online.pdf 

[6] The UN World Happiness Index always shows the richest, cleanest and safest countries at the top of the list, year after year (i.e. Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Canada, Denmark, Netherlands, etc.). Source: http://unsdsn.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/WorldHappinessReport2013_online.pdf 

[7] It became necessary to “keep the customer dissatisfied", as Charles F. Kettering of General Motors famously wrote in 1929 (Kettering was General Director of Research Laboratories at General Motors from 1920 to 1947). See also, J. K. Galbraith's now classic, The Affluent Society (Penguin Books, 1999). He writes on p.128, for instance, that efforts were eventually made by business to “create the wants it seeks to satisfy”.

[8] See Professor B. Friedman, Moral Consequences of Economic Growth, Chapter 1. Further, Richard Easterlin, professor of economics at University of Southern California, says that previous generations have proven that our desires adjust to our income. At all levels of income most people usually estimate that they need about 20 percent more than they have in order to be “perfectly happy”. (Professor R. Easterlin, The Economics of Happiness).

[9] J. Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses, p111. (Austral, Edición Conmemorativa, 2005.)

[10] As in the “right” to “decent” housing or the “right “to “worthy” employment, and many others such “rights”.

[11] The national Gini coefficient, which measures income inequality in a country, is now generally below 30 for the welfare states of Western Europe. See, for instance, Eurostat (www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/qualityoflife/eurlife/) 

[12] L. Strauss, Liberal Education and Responsibility (essay). 

[13] J. Dewey, Experience and Nature, p315. Dover Publications, Inc., 1958. 

[14] Plato considered that such an intellectual intuition (noesis), together with discursive reasoning (dianoia), is what makes up the thinking activity (nous) of man.

The Desk Soldier

The salaried worker is worried. Unconsciously, he worries the day will come when he might have to use rational thought. If, as the years go by, such a day does not come, he will relax in his routine and perhaps forget that unfamiliar sensation when the light of reason suddenly illuminates his mind. He will finally almost convince himself that intellectual insight is imaginary and not applicable to the real world.

On rare occasions, however, a task that requires reason to complete will land on the desk of the salaried worker. This is a provocation to fight – not a war – but a mental battle with reason for arms. When this duel cannot be avoided and if, after the confrontation, victory ensues, such an event is later remembered as one of those moments when the mind caught a reflection of itself. 

A ray of light then suddenly shines deep into the cave where the salaried worker is chained with his face to the wall, looking only at the shadows of equally pathetic figures that he is convinced make up the world. The bright light of reason catches his attention and makes him doubt; he is intrigued by its source. He ought perhaps to get better acquainted with it if only he could but for his heavy armour and the chains that tie him to his office desk. 

Most of the time, the dreaded encounter never materialises though; for some pretext or other it is called off or directed elsewhere, to the great relief of the desk soldier. He can then safely resume the routine tasks that allow him to put his mind on hold throughout his working day and throughout his life. The salaried mind grows rusty from lack of exercise and before middle age the desk soldier is usually no longer fit for such a struggle. 

With every passing year, the likelihood fades that the desk soldier will be able to gather the determination to pull his visor down again and lift his lance to engage his mind. Before he knows it, the salaried worker will drift into complacency, staying predictably on the safe road that leads to retirement and old age.

The Concept of Eurasia - Part III

Ideally, geopolitical concepts such as “Eurasia” should consider the divergence that exists between the interests of the state and the interests of the people. Both from the point of view of Europe and Russia, “Eurasia” represents a geopolitical interest of a higher order. As can be expected, the people's interest in the realisation of “Eurasia,” both for a Russian citizen and for a European citizen, is therefore doubtful at best. The people has an interest in the lower order activities of the state that concern the defence and the security of the nation. Abstract geopolitical concepts like “Eurasia” mean almost nothing to the common man. 

Indeed, it is difficult to understand how the average Russian citizen might be more secure if Russia establishes the Eurasian Economic Union with other nations. The basic security of Russian citizens is still far from guaranteed today; the Russian state therefore ought to deal with other more important internal priorities - the real interests of the Russian people. 

It is also difficult to understand how the average European citizen might be safer and more secure if the EU somehow managed to integrate economically and politically with Russia. And it is highly dubious, to say the least, whether the peoples of Europe would have much to gain by bringing Ukraine into the European economic and political sphere. On the contrary, before potentially bearing fruits, any rapprochement with Ukraine would have substantial costs for Europe, which hitherto have been born by Russia.

The publics of all nations should therefore make efforts to inform themselves about their “nation's” geopolitical plans, and ask themselves whether the realisation of the state's geopolitical interests can be advantageous to them. In the case of “Eurasia,” the people should at least request from their elected representatives, the answer to the following questions: Will the realisation of this geopolitical interest make the public safer? If yes, then in what way? If yes, then what public resources would be spent in order to do so?[1] 

Unfortunately, both these questions and their answers are usually absent from public debate. Clearly, this would not be the case in any reasonably democratic political system, where the interests of the state are interests of the people.

Notes: 

[1] For instance, the cost of the Iraq war was only disclosed years later to the public and the cost was estimated to be much higher than initially declared. See, for instance, Stiglitz and Blimes, Vanity Fair, April 2008. www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2008/04/stiglitz200804

The Concept of Eurasia - Part II

The question of the realisation of “Eurasia” requires an analysis of the order of priority of this geopolitical interest. From this point of view, “Eurasia” is an ambitious goal for both Europe and Russia; it is a geopolitical interest of a high order, far from the basic interest of national defence and security.

However, “Eurasia” is a more important geopolitical interest to realise for Russia than for Europe. Russia considers, naturally, that one of its fundamental geopolitical interests is to exercise some form of control of what it calls its “nearer abroad.”[1] Europe's motivation for realising its own version of “Eurasia” does not have as high priority, for a number of reasons, one being the existence of security agreements with the USA. It is not surprising, therefore, that Russia's realisation of its view of “Eurasia” is in a far more advanced state compared to the European one, which is at the moment only an idea. Europe has not yet fully managed to bring Ukraine into its fold, whereas the customs union between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan is now called the Eurasian Economic Union, and Russia has successfully convinced Armenia, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan to join as members in 2015.[2] In other words, Russia is in the process of adding economic integration to a military integration that has largely taken place already between these countries. 

Some of the types of coercive methods that are available for the realisation of geopolitical interests are used in the case of “Eurasia”. Being the more powerful nation, Russia is naturally using many such means in order to incite, or force, other nations into its sphere of influence. This has been the case with Armenia, and other nations that will adhere to the Eurasian Economic Union which Russia will lead. Europe has also been trying to use some of these coercive foreign policy tools in order to get Russia to show more interest in an integration with Europe.[3] This has been evident not only in the EU's hitherto inconclusive approach towards Ukraine, but also in its interaction with Russia, such as the latest sanctions show.[4] The European Union considers, rightly, that the biggest obstacle to the realisation of its concept of “Eurasia,” is the Russian government. But coercive methods are far more useful and effective when stronger nations use them on decidedly weaker ones. Therefore, while Russia can use coercive methods to realise its view of “Eurasia,” Europe can only realise its own version of “Eurasia” by consensual means. 

There are two conditions for consensual realisation of geopolitical interests; firstly, the “Eurasian” interests should be complementary between Europe and Russia. This is certainly not the case, since the two parties do not even define “Eurasia” in the same way. In fact, the European and Russian definitions of “Eurasia” cannot both be realised at the same time. Further, Europe and Russia are currently opposed in several important geopolitical areas, the most important of which being the struggle for the control of Ukraine.[5] This is not the kind of environment in which the European definition of “Eurasia” can be realised. The Russian view of “Eurasia,” on the other hand, has more probability of success since it does not depend on Europe (with the exception of Ukraine, which will remain problematic for Russia in the future). 

The second condition, which must also be fulfilled in order to realise “Eurasia” by consensual agreement, requires that there is no third party with the capability and interest in thwarting these efforts. Here is another strong reason why “Eurasia” cannot be realised by Europe: the interest of the United States is in conflict with these “Eurasian” interests. Though the USA and Europe are close allies, the USA opposes the European view of “Eurasia” and cannot allow it to happen. For the US, as Brzezinski wrote, “it is imperative that no Eurasian challenger emerges capable of dominating Eurasia and thus of also challenging America.”[6] Currently, Washington easily realises this interest, given the political influence they have over Europe.[7] The US uses its system of military allegiance (NATO) in order to both dominate Europe and contain Russian geopolitical expansion.[8] Regarding the Russian “Eurasia,” though the US may not be able to prevent it from becoming reality, the US is also more tolerant to it. The United States is not much concerned about Russia's realisation of this interest, since it understands that Russia will never be a challenger for global hegemony unless it has integrated with a major economy.[9] This is the reason the US is carefully monitoring the current rapprochement that is taking place between Russia and China.[10] In many ways, the strategic and economic synergies between Russia and China are greater in the long term than the ones between Russia and Europe.[11] 

It is clear, therefore, that the realisation of a geopolitical interest like “Eurasia” greatly depends on the national perspective. This post and the previous one have shown that a geopolitical interest and the ways to realise this interest require radically different approaches. The third and final post on this topic of “Eurasia” will concern the necessary distinction between state and people. In other words, the question that must be asked is to what respect do the people really have an “interest” in “Eurasia”?

Notes: 

[1] In Russian : “ближнее зарубежье” 

[2] Armenia decided in September 2013 to join the “Eurasia” Customs Union. See “Russia Cancels Export Duties for Gas and Diamonds to Armenia” from Ria Novosti, at: en.ria.ru/russia/20131202/185221476/Russia-Cancels-Export-Duties-for-Gas-and-Diamonds-to-Armenia.html 

[3] See for instance, “The EU has accused Russia of implementing protectionist measures in contravention of the WTO rules. The European Commission, meanwhile, is expected to shortly unveil a number of anti-trust charges against Russian state-owned energy company Gazprom.” See article, EU-Russia talks downgraded amid tensions over Ukraine, The Irish Times, January 28, 2014. 

[4] For information on European sanctions against Russia, see for instance, “Russia hints at tit-for-tat response to EU sanctions over Crimea”, The Guardian, Saturday 22 March 2014. Source: 
www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/22/crimea-russia-response-eu-sanctions-ukraine 
Regarding Ukraine, see for instance, article by Finian Cunningham, “Ukraine and the Bigger Picture of US and European Assault on Russia’s Sphere of Influence”, Dec 6 2013. Also, by the same author: “Ukraine: Imagine Western Interference in Reverse… That Would Be An Impossible European Dream”, Dec 16, 2013. Sources at: 
www.strategic-culture.org/news/2013/12/06/ukraine-and-bigger-picture-us-and-european-assault-russia-sphere-influence.html www.strategic-culture.org/news/2013/12/16/ukraine-imagine-western-interference-reverse-would-impossible-european-dream.html 

[5] See for instance the following analysis: “The EU Agreement [for Ukraine] excludes simultaneous membership in a Russian-led customs union and would thus cut off Ukraine from its main trading partner, with which Ukraine’s industry and transport routes are closely connected. The abolition of customs duties on European goods would also mean bankruptcy for many Ukrainian industries.
The terms of the agreement, which include the introduction of EU rules for labor market deregulation, the privatization of state enterprises and a reduction in the public debt, would have a social impact similar to the EU austerity programs imposed on Greece, Romania and other countries. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is already denying Ukraine a much-needed credit because the government refuses to hike the price of gas by 40 percent—a move that would inevitably result in the death of many unemployed people and pensioners unable to pay their heating bills.
The Association Agreement would turn the country into an extended workbench for German and European companies, which could produce at lower wage rates than those in China. At the same time, the country’s natural resources, its vast and fertile landmass, and its domestic market of 46 million inhabitants make Ukraine a mouthwatering prospect for German and European businesses.
The agreement would also strengthen the EU’s hand against Russia. A customs union or Eurasian Union comprising Russia and the Ukraine would have had a significantly stronger position in trade negotiations with the EU than an isolated Russia. 
Germany, the EU and the US are pursuing not only economic, but also geopolitical, objectives in Ukraine. Given Russia’s loss of influence in Eastern Europe since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the incorporation of Ukraine into the EU would push Russia off to the edge of Europe.” from “The Struggle for Ukraine”, from World Socialist Web Site, Dec 6, 2013. (www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/06/pers-d06.html?view=mobilearticle) 

[6] Z. Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard (Basic Books), p. xiv. This is the same view that George Friedman has: “The United States doesn’t need to win wars. It needs to simply disrupt things so the other side can’t build up sufficient strength to challenge it.” The Next 100 Years, p58. (Doubleday). Source: www.fd.unl.pt/docentes_docs/ma/amg_MA_11180.pdf 

[7] It is well known that though the US and Europe have different geopolitical interests, the US is the stronger party and often uses Europe as a proxy for its dealings in “Eurasia.” European governments and institutions are so dominated politically and militarily by the United States, that those European leaders who support this concept of “Eurasia” cannot be fully sincere, whether they realise this or not. A real possibility for European version of “Eurasia” can only come if and when Europe manages to completely get rid of this US dominance which has existed since the end of WWII. However, as long as European companies have significant commercial interests in the US, this is not likely to happen. And this certainly cannot happen with the NATO policy as it is today.

[8] For information on NATO's aggressive military positioning next to Russia's borders (see for instance www.strategic-culture.org/news/2013/10/17/nato-steadfast-jazz-exercise-chill-of-cold-war.html 

[9] Another possibility might be to make its own economy globally competitive, but this is not likely to happen even in the long term.

[10] “Eurasia” is no longer the most important geopolitical goal in the 21^st century for the United States: it is Asia, and in particular, China. US now has a “Pivot to Asia” strategy. See article in The Atlantic “What Exactly Does it Mean That the US is Pivoting to Asia?”, by Matt Schiavenza, April 15, 2013. Source: www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/04/what-exactly-does-it-mean-that-the-us-is-pivoting-to-asia/274936/ 

[11] Russia is turning its attention to the East, and in particular to China (the Law changing the Russian time zones is one example, bringing Moscow 4 hours from both London and Beijing). China has a strong need for the Russian natural resources lying in relative proximity. The trade between the two countries is expected to soon reach $100Bln per year. From 2012 to 2013, China's FDI into Russia was multiplied by 6. Further, China has now declared a certain preference for the Russian rouble, and recently Russia and China have declared that they have a “strategic relationship”. A new deal concerning gas delivery over 30 years has just been signed. See following sources: 
rt.com/business/rosneft-china-sinopec-oil-537/ 

rt.com/business/russia-china-trade-record-836/ 
www.economonitor.com/blog/2013/12/china-says-no-to-bitcoins-but-yes-to-the-russian-rouble/?utm_source=contactology&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=EconoMonitor%20Highlights%3A%20Whither%20U.S.%20Policy

www.contrepoints.org/2014/01/16/153513-investissements-chinois-en-russie-multiplies-par-six-en-2013?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter
www.bbc.com/news/business-27503017
 

The Concept of Eurasia - Part I

The concept of “Eurasia” illustrates well the problematic nature of geopolitics. “Eurasia” is one of the most important geopolitical concepts; as Zbigniew Brzezinski said, “ever since the continents started interacting politically, some five hundred years ago, Eurasia has been the center of world power.”[1] “Eurasia” encapsulates the problematic aspects of geopolitics, starting with semantics. Indeed, it is a portmanteau word with a slightly artificial ring to it, somewhat clumsily combining the words “Europe” and “Asia.” It is a typical geopolitical term; i.e. one whose different definitions reflect nations' different geopolitical interests. 

Originally, “Eurasia” is a geographical notion: in this sense, it is simply the biggest continent; the combined landmass of Europe and Asia. However, geopolitically, the word has several different meanings, reflecting the specific geopolitical interests of each nation. In the widest possible sense, the geopolitical definition of “Eurasia” is consistent with its geographical area. This is sometimes the way the word is understood in countries located at the fringes of, or outside, this area. This is generally what is meant by “Eurasia” in political circles in the USA, Japan and India.[2] Two other, narrower definitions of “Eurasia” are also worth noting: the European one and the Russian one.

When Western European political scientists talk about “Eurasia”, they generally mean Russia integrated into Europe (including Ukraine of course), economically, politically, and even militarily. At least since Napoleon, if not since Peter the Great, European strategists have understood the importance of allying with Russia, and the potential consequences of failing to do so. However, the current European view of “Eurasia” is, for obvious reasons, a far more recent concept, having emerged only in the last two decades, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Incidentally, this political entity is about half the size, and has only 15% of the population, of the geographical “Eurasia.” Two observations are necessary with respect to what is assumed to be “Europe.” Firstly, in this case, “Europe” is seen as a single economic and political entity; i.e. the European Union.[3] Secondly, in this context of “Eurasia,” “Europe” primarily means Germany. Not only has Germany emerged as the de facto leader of Europe both economically and politically after the recent financial crisis, but it also has deeper historical ties with Russia than most other nations of the European Union. It also has a stronger geopolitical interest in a political and economic integration with Russia, than the rest of the EU.[4] 

Therefore, from this Western European perspective, “Eurasia” means specifically the idea of Russia's close integration with the European Union in general and with Germany in particular (not the other way around, of course). What would this European concept of “Eurasia” mean in practice? As always, integration between nations can take place in several ways; economically, politically, militarily, and even culturally. “Eurasia” would mean at least the following, from a European point of view: at an economic level, the signing of trade agreements removing trade barriers and lowering tariffs as well as removing legal and bureaucratic hurdles to European investment in Russia; at a political level, an agreement of a EU integration model for Ukraine that is acceptable to Russia, the reduction of Russian border controls and Russian visa restrictions between the two entities, and increasing institutional collaboration; and at a military level, closer Russian alignment with the European Common Security and Defence Policy as well as, inevitably, NATO, as well as some coordination between security and military forces, and a substantial increase in procurement of European weapons by the Russian armed forces.[5] Most of these cooperation areas are already included in the concept of “Four Common Spaces” which was established in 2003 between the EU and Russia, but funded by the former.[6] 

Europe's geopolitical interest in “Eurasia”, as understood by European policy-makers, is clear and the would-be advantages for Europe are well known.[7] However, though Russia would make some gains in the long term from such an integration with Europe, Russia's geopolitical interests are clearly not complementary with the European version of “Eurasia.”[8] As one of the few independent nations of the world, Russia insists on establishing relations with Europe, “on a basis of equality and mutual benefit.”[9] This is something that Europe neither has the interest, nor the obligation, to accept. Not surprisingly, and often to the frustration of European policy-makers, naturally interested in pushing their own agenda of further integration, Russia has different geopolitical interests, as becomes clear from the Russian definition of “Eurasia.” 

The Russian concept of “Eurasia” is very different from the European one. It is a view that has older roots than the European one - not surprisingly, considering Russia's geographic position. Russian politologists traditionally view Russia itself, being both European and Asian, as “Eurasian.” The geopolitical area of the Russian concept of “Eurasia” corresponded initially more or less to the land area of Imperial Russia in 1914, including parts of Eastern Europe.[10] There is undeniably an influence of Panslavism in this definition; originally the idea of “Eurasia” was more romantically rooted in natural geography. It was the idea that the people scattered across the land called “Eurasia” shared common spiritual values due to its geographic traits, such as a flat land with few coastlines but important rivers, a particular climate (continental, often harshly so), and a certain landscape (steppe, taiga, tundra). This idea was more or less realised, but with difficulty, during the last phases of the Russian Empire and was then realised again with the Soviet Union after 1945, though not stably enough for enduring success.

Today, though this Russian geopolitical interest still exists, the physical area of the Russian “Eurasia” is now more realistically assessed. The Russian view today is that “Eurasia” consists of the land lying between Europe and Asia proper; namely, those made up of Western and Central Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, part of Caucasus, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan.[11] Just as in the case of the European concept of “Eurasia,” the Russian version of “Eurasia” is a geopolitical interest that underpins foreign policy in that part of the world. Thus, it is not surprising that today one of Russia's main geopolitical interests lies in ever closer integration with those countries that it considers part of “Eurasia.”

This review of the main definitions of the concept of “Eurasia” clearly bring forth the many different geopolitical interests that are understood by this word. The next post will treat the concept of “Eurasia” by looking at the important tactical aspect of geopolitics; namely the question of the realisation of the concept of “Eurasia.”

Notes: 

[1] Z. Brzezinski, highly influential National Security Adviser under US President Jimmy Carter. The quote is from his book “The Grand Chessboard” (Basic Books), p. xiii. Further: “A power that dominates “Eurasia” would control two of the world’s three most advanced and economically productive regions. A mere glance at the map also suggests that control over “Eurasia” would almost automatically entail Africa’s subordination, rendering the Western Hemisphere and Oceania geopolitically peripheral to the world’s central continent. About 75 per cent of the world’s people live in “Eurasia”, and most of the world’s physical wealth is there as well, both in its enterprises and underneath its soil. “Eurasia” accounts for about three-fourths of the world’s known energy resources.” (p.31) 

[2] For instance, this is the way Zbigniew Brzezinski sees ”Eurasia”, naturally taking the US position. 

[3] Indeed, both Ukraine and Turkey have their own very specific historical, economic, and geopolitical relationship with Russia. And as for “Europe” meaning the EU in this case, this is not to say that the EU is not still quite far from being such a “single economic and political entity.” 

[4] This is all the more true today since Germany in the financial crisis has further increased its economic and political domination of the European Union. At the same time, the British are probably distancing themselves from the EU, if not de jure yet, at least rhetorically, and France has deep structural problems of its own, preventing it from driving the EU project together with Germany like it has in the past. Germany export-oriented industry is perfectly suited to address the Russian market, and at the same time it needs Russia's resources. Further, Germany has already got the most developed economic ties with Russia of any major nation. 

[5] Russia has recently bought French war ships. See RIA Novosti “France Floats Out First Russian Mistral”, Oct 15, 2013 (en.ria.ru/trend/warship_01102009/) 

[6] At the St. Petersburg Summit in May 2003, the EU and Russia agreed to reinforce their co-operation by creating, in the long term, four common spaces in the framework of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 1997: a common economic space; a common space of freedom, security and justice; a space of co-operation in the field of external security; and a space of research, education, and cultural exchange. 

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russia%E2%80%93European_Union_relations#The_Four_Common_Spaces 

[7] Main advantages: The wealthy but struggling economies of the European Union could certainly benefit from tighter integration with the Russian economy for the resources the latter has to offer. These include both the human and natural resources of Russia. There is an obvious interest in getting close access to a large, low-wage and relatively well-educated population. It would bring energy security to Europe by removing once and for all the political and bureaucratic obstacles to the cheap and joint use of Russia's rich natural resources (gas and oil, but not only). Economically, the realisation of this concept of “Eurasia” would mean that European companies would gain direct access to the huge investment needs of Russian society. From a military perspective, a closer collaboration with Russia would add precisely the element of “hard” power that Europe lacks in order to fulfil its geopolitical interest of dominating the world once again. It would also close once and for all the security issue that Europe perceives in having an independent Russia so close to its eastern borders, as the adherence to NATO of many Eastern European countries show. 

[8] See for instance, the following information about EU/Russian trade. Russia EU trade, at: russianmission.eu/en/trade 

[9] See quotation from Mr. Lavrov, Russia Foreign Minister, at: russianmission.eu/en/brief-overview-relations 

[10] This Russian concept of “Eurasia” can trace its origin to certain Russian émigrés in the 1920s Berlin, Prague and Sofia. For more details regarding the entire paragraph above, see История евразийского движения, at: www.gumer.info/bibliotek_Buks/Polit/nart/04.php 

[11] See for instance, this interesting discussion of the Russian view of “Eurasia.” Article by Dmitry Trenin, VPK daily, 29^th January 2013, at : rbth.co.uk/opinion/2013/01/29/revising_the_concept_of_“Eurasia”_22305.html