As has often been noted,
« majority rule » in the political sense does not exist
in the way it is presented by the dominant institutions of Western so-called “democracies”.
The Western public’s resistance to criticism of democracy is therefore remarkable.
The staying power of representative democracy
in the West can be explained as follows. Firstly, democracy is widely but
uncritically seen as a progressive and enlightened political system that
replaced monarchies typically portrayed as retrograde and repressive. Secondly,
despite the difficulty of “majority rule”, democracy can play a role of channeling
public opinion in the politicized society. These two points are explained
below.
Democracy as a Questionable Improvement to Monarchy
The dominant storyline is one that sees
democracy as a moral improvement over monarchy; governments today receive their
legitimacy from the will of the people and no longer from the divine right of
kings. However, this is a largely caricatural and counterfactual view, not
least since elections and voting practices are not specific to “liberal
democracies”; some were in
use long before political representation was
introduced.
The often-touted “will of the people” is the
latest “political formula”, to use the phrase of Italian historian Gaetano
Mosca, allowing the “organized minority” to justify its rule over a “disorganized
and uninterested majority” in the secular era of individual rights. From this
standpoint, there is no fundamental difference between democracy and monarchy.
As James Burnham summarized in The
Machiavellians (1943); “The existence of a minority ruling class is, it must be stressed, a
universal feature of all organized societies of which we have any record. It
holds no matter what the social and political forms—whether the society is
feudal or capitalist or slave or collectivist, monarchical or oligarchical or
democratic, no matter what the constitutions and laws, no matter what the
professions and beliefs.”
Though it is commonplace today to compare
democracy positively to monarchy, this becomes problematic when the yardstick
is liberty. Economic and political freedom is not an obvious consequence of the
right to vote, as should be clear in the West today. Liberty relates to the protection
of private property and should be seen as inversely correlated with the size
and power of the state.
Despite the flaws of monarchy, and certainly
in its late absolutist expression, as a political system linking power with private
land ownership it had a natural inclination to protect
property rights. With time, in particular in the democratic era, the public
domain has grown at the expense of the private property. Not coincidentally, the
growth of the modern regulatory state,
financed by an explosion of money printing and taxation, began as societies
became democratic.
In modern democracies, the differences between
political parties have decreased with the centripetal pull of the political
center. The electorate often votes for programs that it barely knows and which
later are hardly implemented. Election fraud is widespread.
All too often, campaign promises have little to do with actual policy. Rousseau
may have only slightly exaggerated when he wrote in The Social Contract (1762) about
British parliamentarism, that in between elections the “individual is a slave,
he is nothing”.
This reality is starting to impinge on some in
the West, as can be noted by mounting political tensions. But the illusion
is generally so strong, not least among the well-educated, that most people
seem, like in the “The Emperor's New Clothes”, to be complicit in their own
deception about democracy.
Democracy as a Conduit for Public Opinion
The importance of public opinion to political
power was recognized by Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century and then clearly
expressed by Etienne de la Boétie in his Discourse on Voluntary Servitude (1549).
David Hume noted
(1777) that “it is on opinion only that government is founded; and this maxim
extends to the most despotic and most military governments, as well as to the
most free and most popular”.
Democracies thus take into account public
opinion, but not so much because of their “democratic” nature, but because they
are obliged to do so. But since democratic rulers draw their legitimacy from
the “will of the people”, the management of public opinion is arguably even
more important in “representative” political systems than in authoritarian
regimes, as Noam Chomsky noted.
As a result, democratic states will naturally be tempted to use propaganda, disinformation,
and censorship, in order to obtain or maintain the people’s consent, as Aldous
Huxley presciently recognized.
A strong and independent fourth estate is obviously
crucial. As, the German legal theorist Carl Schmitt noted, “discussion” and “openness” are
prerequisites for a representative democracy not to slide towards authoritarianism.
He explained
that “to discussion belong shared convictions as premises, the willingness to
be persuaded, independence of party ties, freedom from selfish interests. Most
people today would regard such disinterestedness as scarcely possible. But even
this skepticism belongs to the crisis of parliamentarism."
Indeed, a democracy that fulfills these prerequisites, i.e. one that allows such conditions of transparency in society, is “scarcely possible” because it inevitably tends to become victim of its own democratic success. The ruling minority, pressured by the inevitable political scrutiny and healthy criticism allowed by these conditions, would try to undermine those very conditions of “discussion” and “openness” that initially helped legitimize its rule. The attempted restrictions and state control of social media platforms are examples of this today.
Yet unlike authoritarian regimes, the
democratic process can allow the majority to publicly sanction or reward
different political forces within the ruling minority, by acting as a conduit
for public opinion. As Mosca explained: “the electoral function is a means by which
certain political forces control and limit the action of others, when it is
exercised in good social conditions.” These “good social conditions” certainly
include Carl Schmitt’s criteria above.
Ludwig von Mises also recognized
this “social function” of democracy, “that form of political constitution which
makes possible the adaptation of the government to the wishes of the governed
without violent struggles.” Particularly in the politicized West with its highly
interventionist states, the democratic process can, when conditions allow it,
act as a valve for the majority’s pent up political dissatisfaction.
When the social conditions are unfavorable for
this process to have much effect, then democracy as a political system starts being
questioned and political crisis ensues. This is arguably what is happening in
the West today, as elections hardly bring political change and the Western
financial globalist oligarchy tries to tighten
its control of the international political agenda.
Despite the weaknesses of democracy, it nevertheless
has significant staying power in the West for the reasons above. As this
staying power seems to be currently eroding, it is as essential as ever to remind
the public of the principles and benefits of freedom.
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